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The 1AC’s impacts are not objective or neutral. The narrative of space exploration is produced by dominant modes of securitization. This creates flawed knowledge production which sustains security, even though scientists believe they are being objective

Mellor 2007, felicity,Prof @– Imperial College (London), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space.” Social Studies of Science Vol. 37, No. 4 (Aug., 2007), pp. 499-531

During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technological salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a ‘giggle factor’ and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in capturing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in establishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being distant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconceptualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God’s handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and distant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a theatre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact–extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy – telescopes and, later, space probes – were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as ‘monsters’ – portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsuspecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active surveillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be supplemented with the technologies of war. By the 1980s and 1990s, asteroid science, defence science and science fiction all presented space as an arena for technological intervention where an invisible enemy would be defeated for the greater good of mankind. Science fiction provided a culturally available resource that could give concrete form to the ideas of both asteroid scientists and weapons designers. Through narrative, the timeless and universal speculations of science could be converted into a specific sequence of events. By drawing on narratives of technological salvation, asteroid scientists made their case more compelling, but they also became dependent on narrative scenarios shared by the defence scientists. Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that ‘we too need to declare war on the heavens’. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifiable enemy. The civilian scientists attempted to still their consciences in their dealings with the defence scientists by suggesting that, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of SDI, the latter had lost their traditional role. This argument was naive at best. In fact, as we have seen, the US defence scientists had taken an interest in the impact threat since the early 1980s, from the time that SDI had greatest political support during the defence build-up of the Reagan era. Even at the time of the fractious Interception Workshop, George H.W. Bush was maintaining SDI funding at the same level as it had been during the second Reagan administration. If outwardly the Clinton administration was less supportive when it took office in 1993 and declared that SDI was over, many of those involved in the programme felt that it would actually go on much as before (FitzGerald, 2000: 491). SDI was renamed, and to some extent reconceived, but funding continued and was soon increased when the Republicans gained a majority in Congress.33 After George W. Bush took office in 2001, spending on missile defence research was greatly increased, including programmes to follow on from Brilliant Pebbles (Wall, 2001a; 2001b). Thus the defence scientists had shown an interest in the impact threat from the time of the very first meeting onwards, regardless of the state of funding for missile defence, which in any case continued throughout the period. This is not to suggest that the impact threat was not used by the defence scientists as a means of maintaining the weapons establishment. Indeed, the impact threat offered a possible means of circumventing or undermining arms treaties.34 But it does mean that the attempt to access new sources of funding, while being an important factor in the promotion of asteroids as a threat, did not fully explain either the weapons scientists’ interests or the civilian scientists’ repeated meetings

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[CONTINUED]with them. The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the promotion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of spacebased weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact missions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and thinking, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the centre of US defence policy. In this post-Cold War period, scholars of the relation between military and civilian science need to examine carefully claims about ‘ploughshare’ or ‘conversion’ technologies. New technologies arise not just out of funding and policy decisions, but also out of the social imaginaries in which new weapons can be imagined and construed as necessary. Concepts such as ‘dual use’ or ‘cover’ also need to be assessed critically.35 One way of characterizing the Clementine missions would be as dual-use technologies whose scientific aims served as cover for the testing of SDI technologies. Yet this fails to reveal the ways in which these missions were just one concrete output of a more fundamental conceptual alliance between weapons designers and astronomers. In this paper, I have attempted to show that by also considering the narrative context in which such initiatives are located, it is possible to throw some light on the cultural web that binds civilian science to military programmes. But the focus on narrative also begs a question: Which stories would we prefer to frame our science? Should science be driven by fear or by curiosity? Should it be aimed at creating technologies of war or cultures of compassion? These are normative questions, but they are also precisely the questions that make the military influence on science such an important issue. Narratives are inherently ideological and a refusal to see them as such does no more to enhance the scholar’s objectivity than it does the scientist’s. The stories told by the asteroid scientists led them into collaborations with weapons scientists and helped fuel a discourse of fear that served a particular ideological purpose. This should be both recognized and challenged, not for the sake of regaining some impossible ideal of an undistorted science but because there are other stories, based on different ideological assumptions, that we could tell in order to guide science towards more peaceful ends.

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**Security is an endless cycle- we are never “secure enough.” This is the logic of total annihilation, ending with the loss of humanity**

Mészáros 3 (István, Hungarian Marxist philosopher, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex. He held the Chair of Philosophy at Sussex for fifteen years and was earlier Professor of Philosophy and Social Science for four years at York University. The Monthly Review, “Militarism and the Coming Wars” June 2003. http://monthlyreview.org/0603meszaros.htm 7/9/09)

The dangers and immense suffering caused by all attempts at solving deep-seated social problems by militaristic interventions, on any scale, are obvious enough. If, however, we look more closely at the historical trend of militaristic adventures, it becomes frighteningly clear that they show an ever greater intensification and an ever-increasing scale, from local confrontations to two horrendous world wars in the twentieth century, and to the potential annihilation of humankind when we reach our own time.

It is most relevant to mention in this context the distinguished Prussian military officer and practical as well as theoretical strategist, Karl Marie von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who died in the same year as Hegel; both of them killed by cholera. It was von Clausewitz, director of the Military School of Berlin in the last thirteen years of his life, who in his posthumously published book—Vom Kriege (On War, 1833)—offered a classic definition of the relationship between politics and war that is still frequently quoted: “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

This famous definition was tenable until quite recently, but has become totally untenable in our time. It assumed the rationality of the actions which connect the two domains of politics and war as the continuation of one another. In this sense, the war in question had to be winnable, at least in principle, even if miscalculations leading to defeat could be contemplated at the instrumental level. Defeat by itself could not destroy the rationality of war as such, since after the—however unfavorable—new consolidation of politics the defeated party could plan another round of war as the rational continuation of its politics by other means. Thus the absolute condition of von Clausewitz’s equation to be satisfied was the winnability of war in principle, so as to recreate the “eternal cycle” of politics leading to war, and back to politics leading to another war, and so on ad infinitum. The actors involved in such confrontations were the national states. No matter how monstrous the damage inflicted by them on their adversaries, and even on their own people (just remember Hitler!), the rationality of the military pursuit was guaranteed if the war could be considered winnable in principle.

Today the situation is qualitatively different for two principal reasons. First, the objective of the feasible war at the present phase of historical development, in accordance with the objective requirements of imperialism—world domination by capital’s most powerful state, in tune with its own political design of ruthless authoritarian “globalization” (dressed up as “free exchange” in a U.S. ruled global market)—is ultimately unwinnable, foreshadowing, instead, the destruction of humankind. This objective by no stretch of imagination could be considered a rational objective in accord with the stipulated rational requirement of the “continuation of politics by other means” conducted by one nation, or by one group of nations against another. Aggressively imposing the will of one powerful national state over all of the others, even if for cynical tactical reasons the advocated war is absurdly camouflaged as a “purely limited war” leading to other “open ended limited wars,” can therefore be qualified only as total irrationality.

The second reason greatly reinforces the first. For the weapons already available for waging the war or wars of the twenty first century are capable of exterminating not only the adversary but the whole of humanity, for the first time ever in history. Nor should we have the illusion that the existing weaponry marks the very end of the road. Others, even more instantly lethal ones, might appear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Moreover, threatening the use of such weapons is by now considered an acceptable state strategic device.

Thus, put reasons one and two together, and the conclusion is inescapable: envisaging war as the mechanism of global government in today’s world underlines that we find ourselves at the precipice of absolute irrationality from which there can be no return if we accept the ongoing course of development. What was missing from von Clausewitz’s classic definition of war as the “continuation of politics by other means” was the investigation of the deeper underlying causes of war and the possibility of their avoidance. The challenge to face up to such causes is more urgent today than ever before. For the war of the twenty first century looming ahead of us is not only “not winnable in principle.” Worse than that, it is in principle unwinnable. Consequently, envisaging the pursuit of war, as the Bush administration’s September 17, 2002 strategic document does, make Hitler’s irrationality look like the model of rationality.

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Alternative: Reject the 1AC’s logic of security.

We must break from current ideologies. Only the alternative can solve

MacDonald 2007 (Fraser, prof of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies @

University of Melbourne ) “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography” *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5) (2007) pp. 592–615

Astrography and astropolitics, like geography and geopolitics, constitute ‘a political domination and cultural imagining of space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). While commentators like Colin Gray have posited an ‘inescapable geography’ (eg, ‘of course, physical geography is politically neutral’), a critical agenda conceives of geography not as a fixed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109). For geography, read ‘astrography’. We must be alert to the ‘declarative’ (‘this is how the Outer Earth is’) and ‘imperative’ (‘this is what we must do’) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 107). The models of Mackinder and Mahan that are so often applied to the space environment are not unchanging laws; on the contrary they are themselves highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical circumstances. (2) Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinize the power politics of the expert/ think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic accountability (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 108). (3) Mackinder’s ‘end of geography’ thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the world order to fi t British interests (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolman’s vision of space strategy bears striking similarities. Like Ó Tuathail’s critique of Mackinder’s imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as ‘triumphalism blind to its own precariousness’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that ‘the United States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo campaign, and stands at the forefront of history capable of presiding over the birth of a bold New World Order’. One might argue, however, that Mackinder – as the theorist of imperial decline – may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik: there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about US dominance in space, even if the USA were to pursue this imperial logic. (4) Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism. Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because ‘they’ are not like ‘us’. ‘The most ruthlessly suitable’ candidates for space dominance, we are told – ‘the most capably endowed’ – are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman, 2002: 27). (5) A critical astropolitics must challenge the ‘mythic’ properties of Astropolitik and disrupt its reverie for the ‘timeless insights’ of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Ó Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity … in a complex world’ and is ‘fetishistically concerned with …. prophecy’ (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). Ó Tuathail’s critical project, by contrast, seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized. V Conclusion Stephen Graham, following Eyal Weizmann, has argued that geopolitics is a flat discourse (Weizmann, 2002; Graham, 2004: 12). It attends to the cartographic horizontality of terrain rather than a verticality that cuts through the urban landscape from the advantage of orbital supremacy. Just as, for Graham, a critical geopolitics must urgently consider this new axis in order to challenge the practices and assumptions of urbicide, so too – I would argue – it must lift its gaze to the politics of the overhead. Our interest in the vertical plane must extend beyond terrestrial perspectives; we must come to terms with the everyday realities of space exploration and domination as urgent subjects of critical geographical inquiry. A prerequisite for this agenda is to overcome our sense of the absurdity and oddity of space, an ambivalence that has not served human geography well. The most obvious entry point is to think systematically about some of the more concrete expressions of outer space in the making of Earthly geographies. For instance, many of the high-profi le critical commentaries on the recent war in Iraq, even those written from geographical perspectives, have been slow to address the orbital aspects of military supremacy (see, for instance, Harvey, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Retort, 2005). Suffice to say that, in war as in peace, space matters on the ground, if indeed the terrestrial and the celestial can be sensibly individuated in this way. There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces. When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, there is plainly a particular set of historicogeographical imaginaries at work that give precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbor, most famously in the aftermath of 11 September 2001; notably, in all these examples – Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race – there lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East.9 All of this is a reminder that the colonization of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely an extension of long-standing regimes of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind’ (Redfield, 2002: 814). This line of argument supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earth’s geography (Cosgrove, 2004: 222). We can conceive of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices’ (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that ‘these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may, when linked together, go around the world’. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The ‘space’ of space is both terrestrial and extraterrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Lisa Parks and Ursula Biemann have described our relationship with orbits as being ‘about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and positioning the self ’ (Parks and Biemann, 2003). It is precisely this relational conception of space that might helpfully animate a revised geographical understanding of the Outer Earth. As has already been made clear, this sort of project is by no means new. Just as astropolitics situates itself within a Mackinderian geographical tradition, so a critical geography of outer space can draw on geography’s earlymodern cosmographical origins, as well as on more recent emancipatory perspectives that might interrogate the workings of race, class, gender and imperialism. Space is already being produced in and through Earthly regimes of power in ways that undoubtedly threaten social justice and democracy. A critical geography of space, then, is not some far-fetched or indulgent distraction from the ‘real world’; rather, as critical geographers we need to think about the contest for outer space as being constitutive of numerous familiar operations, not only in respect of international relations and the conduct of war, but also to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the state and to the lives of its citizenry.

Link- Generic

Space policy is a means to securitize

Wang, 2009 Sheng-Chih. .( dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin The Making of New 'Space': Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics. Geopolitics; Autumn 2009, Vol. 14 Issue 3

Geopolitics is a dynamic struggle among strong states who seek to seize new ‘space’ and organise it to fit their own interests. Therefore, ascending European outer space capability makes the struggle between Europe and the US for mastery of outer space the major dynamics of transatlantic astropolitics. As key instruments to pursue such mastery, outer space policy formation and outer space technology development in Europe and the US are quite sensitive to the demands of different types of geopolitical interests. Outer space policy and technology are indispensable tools to seize pivotal positions and resources in outer space, and thereby fulfil states’ political goals. The launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957 manifested the geopolitical prospect of outer space. Geopolitical exploitation of this new ‘space’ then entered security concerns of the US and the Soviet Union. Outer space–related issues burgeoned in their policy agenda, large numbers of funds for outer space technology development were invested, and several outer space–based military systems, such as espionage and reconnaissance satellites, were under construction. Advanced outer space capability not only implied state’s relative security status and sphere of influence, but also served as the key instrument to master this new ‘space’. With the end of the Cold War, civilian outer space technology was popularised rapidly. The goal of outer space policy and technology transformed gradually to pursue economic benefits and social welfare from outer space utilisation. However, these changes do not totally obliterate the very importance of security use of outer space. New types of threats, for example, international terrorism and global environmental problems, make it a difficult task for states to guard their territorial security. Advanced outer space technology like systems of navigation and Earth observation can help states monitor these protean threats and develop capability of security management as well. Since outer space serves as a new ‘space’ for human exploitation, geopolitical variables largely dictate the formation of outer space policy and the development of outer space technology. To explain transatlantic astropolitics, it is important to study these geopolitical variables, including sovereignty, pivotal position in outer space, and the transatlantic security community discourse. Sovereignty can be defined as the exclusive authority and autonomy of a political entity on its own affairs. The impact of globalisation decreases the extent of European and US autonomy in outer space activities, but not their authority for outer space policy making. Outer space remains a state-dominated and geopolitically demarcated realm, although non-state actors are active in international politics. Europe and the US, self-perceived as unitary sovereign actors, pursue geopolitical interests with respective cost-effective strategy. Transatlantic astropolitics is principally conducted by the institutions and governments of Europe and the US. Outer space facilities and resources are also under governmental disposition. Sovereignty remains a crucial component of transatlantic astropolitics. Seizing pivotal position in outer space facilitates states to define outer space agenda, gain a greater share of outer space resources, and control this new ‘space’. Advanced outer space technology is the key instrument facilitating state’s policy goal of seizing pivotal position in outer space. Governments can focus resources to develop desired technology. And advanced technology may offer greater flexibility and broader range of policy options than in the past.11 The ‘pluralistic security community’ proposition regards the transatlantic order as a particular social structure based on common interest, institutions, norms and identities, which renders a remedy for competition over material power. To wit, intensive economic interdependence, shared norms and collective identities embedded in institutional settings determine the very solidarity of the transatlantic security community. This is also the liberal constructivist assumption about the post–Cold War sustainability of the transatlantic alliance. However, it ignores the resurgence of classical geopolitical concerns in transatlantic astropolitics. The goals of European and US outer space policy and technology are always to gain individual geopolitical interests with the most cost-effective strategy. The discourse shared between Europe and the US as a ‘pluralistic security community’ lost its constitutive effect on transatlantic astropolitics. space facilities and resources are also under governmental disposition. Sovereignty remains a crucial component of transatlantic astropolitics. Seizing pivotal position in outer space facilitates states to define outer space agenda, gain a greater share of outer space resources, and control this new ‘space’. Advanced outer space technology is the key instrument facilitating state’s policy goal of seizing pivotal position in outer space. Governments can focus resources to develop desired technology. And advanced technology may offer greater flexibility and broader range of policy options than in the past.11 The ‘pluralistic security community’ proposition regards the transatlantic order as a particular social structure based on common interest, institutions, norms and identities, which renders a remedy for competition over material power. 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Link- Generic

Even seemingly benign space tech creates a panopticon, regardless of the 1AC’s intentions.

MacDonald 2007 (Fraser, prof of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies @

University of Melbourne ) “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography” *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5) (2007) pp. 592–615

The geopolitical effects of reconnaissance from space platforms are by no means confined to particular episodes of military conflict. Like the high-altitude spy plane, its Cold War precursor, satellite surveillance also gives strategic and diplomatic powers. Unlike aerial photography, however, satellite imagery is ubiquitous and high-resolution, and offers the potential for real-time surveillance. The emerging field of surveillance studies, strongly informed by critical geographical thought, has opened to scrutiny the politics and spaces of electronic observation (see, for instance, the new journal *Surveillance and Society*). The writings of Foucault, particularly those on panopticism, are an obvious infl uence on this new work (Foucault, 1977; Wood, 2003), but they have seldom been applied to the realm of outer space. As Foucault pointed out, the power of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison design is enacted through the prisoner–subjects internalizing the disciplinary gaze: the presence of the gaoler was immaterial, as the burden of watching was left to the watched. Similarly, the power of panoptic orbital surveillance lies in its normalizing geopolitical effects. If the geopolitics of surveillance is particularly evident at the level of the state, it applies also to the organization of the daily activities of its citizens (Molz, 2006). GPS technology is perhaps the most evident incursion of space-enabled military surveillance systems into everyday life, becoming an indispensable means of monitoring the location of people and things. For instance, the manufacturer Pro Tech, riding the wave of public concern about paedophilia in Britain, has developed systems currently being trialled by the UK Home Offi ce to track the movements of registered sex offenders (see also Monmonier, 2002: 134). Somewhat predictably, given the apparent crisis in the spatialities of childhood (Jones *et al.*, 2003), children are to be the next subjects of satellite surveillance. In December 2005, the company mTrack launched i-Kids, a mobile phone/GPS unit that allows parents to track their offspring by PC or on a WAPenabled mobile phone. Those with pets rather than children might consider the $460 RoamEO GPS system that attaches to your dog’s collar, should walkies ever get out of hand. It will surprise no one that the same technology gets used for less savoury purposes: a Los Angeles stalker was jailed for 16 months for attaching a GPS device to his ex-girlfriend’s car (Teather, 2004). What is more startling, perhaps, is that one does not need to be a GPSuser to be subject to the surveillant possibilities of this technology. Anyone who leaves their mobile phone unattended for five minutes can be tracked, not just by the security services, but by any individual who has momentary access to enable the phone as a tracking device. For the purposes of a newspaper story, the Guardian journalist Ben Goldacre ‘stalked’ his girlfriend by registering her phone on one of many websites for the commercial tracking of employees and stock (Goldacre, 2006). The exercise revealed how easily everyday technologies like the mobile phone can be reconfigured for very different purposes. Even this modest labour in tracking a mobile phone will become a thing of the past. Phones will be more specifi cally confi gured as a tracking device: Nokia is due to release a GPS phone in 2007, while the Finnish company Benefon has already launched its Twig Discovery, a phone that has a ‘fi nder’ capability that locates and tracks other contacts in your address book. Should the user come within range of another contact, the phone will send a message asking whether you are willing to reveal your location to this contact. If both parties are agreeable, the phones will guide their users to each other. In this way, the gadgetry of space-enabled espionage is being woven into interpersonal as well as interstate and citizen–state relations. If the movements of a car can be tracked by a jealous boyfriend, they can also be tracked by the state for the purposes of taxation: this is surely the future of road tolls in the UK. A British insurance company is already using satellite technology to cut the premiums for young drivers if they stay off the roads between 11pm and 6am, when most accidents occur. Information about the time, duration and route of every single journey made by the driver is recorded and sent back to the company (Bachelor, 2006). The success of geotechnologies will lie in these ordinary reconfi gurations of life such as tracking parcels, locating stolen cars, transport guidance or assisting the navigation of the visually impaired. Some might argue, however, that their impact will be more subtle still. For instance, Nigel Thrift locates the power of new forms of positioning in precognitive sociality and ‘prerefl exive practice’, that is to say in ‘various kinds of culturally inculcated corporeal automatisms’ (Thrift, 2004b: 175). In other words, these sociotechnical changes may become so incorporated into our unconscious that we simply cease to think about our position. Getting lost may become diffi cult (Thrift, 2004b: 188). Perhaps we are not at that stage yet. But one can easily envisage GPS technologies enhancing existing inequalities in the very near future, such as the device that will warn the cautious urban walker that they are entering a ‘bad neighbourhood’. In keeping with the logic of the panopticon, this is less ‘Big Brother’ than an army of little brothers: the social life of the new space age is already beginning to look quite different. And it is to this incipient militarization of everyday life that the emerging lit

Link- Exploration/Frontier

The frontier mentality of the 1AC is based on not just the securitization of space, but the securitization of knowledge which results in a global security state

Grondin, 6 – Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa (David, The (Power) Politics of Space: The U.S. Astropolitical Discourse of Global Dominance in the War on Terror)

From the outset, many may ask why is there, looming over our head, literally and figuratively, a possibility of seeing war and violence spreading to the cosmos? Outer Space, the “endless frontier”, the “last frontier”, John F. Kennedy’s “New Frontier”, is still largely seen as the “pristine frontier”. Who writes and produces Outer Space? The social construction and production of Outer Space means that it is people with agential power that enact and produce Outer Space, that invest it with meanings and produce it with power relations. If we wish to understand US strategy regarding Space and especially how its strategic analysts produce Outer Space as a (soon-to-be)-“weaponized space”, we must go back to Lacoste’s understanding of geography and that of state and military decisionmakers: Geography is first and foremost a strategic knowledge which is closely linked to a set of political and military practices; these practices demand that extremely different, at first sight heterogeneous pieces of information should be brought together. You cannot understand the grounds for existence nor the importance of such information if you confine yourself to the validity of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. These strategic practices make geography necessary, primarily for those who control the machinery of the state. Is this really a science? It does not really matter; the question is not fundamental insofar as one is aware that geography, being the structuring of knowledge relating to space, is a strategic knowledge, a power (Lacoste 1982 [1976]: 7; quoted in Ó Tuathail 1996: 162). We therein need to reflect critically on spatialities of US space power and the discourse of US space power as space weaponization. US astropolitics deals with the “outer frontiers of national security policy”. However, one major feature of the post-9/11 era is that these new frontiers of homeland security are not the territorial borders of the homeland anymore, but rather the new frontiers for securing the homeland. The profound implications of the Global War on Terror and its desire for global security are that no space, place, site or body will be left unscripted, undisciplined and unsecured. In many regards, US astropolitical thinkers see Space as a territory, as a place to be “conquered” and “mastered”. In much of the US astropolitical discourse, Space is seen the “last frontier” experience: it is a hostile and wild environment which could indeed be seen as the quintessential hobbesian “state of nature”. This brings me to discuss the (re)territorialization of Outer Space as an *American* space. These deterritorializaton and reterritorialization are linked to the War on Terror, especially because of the protection of information, the detection, and the surveillance activities of the US, which are central in “hunting down” terrorists. This illustrates another manifestation of the US acting more and more as a “global security state” when acting for its national security.

Link- “Dual Use”

Dual use is used by the government to escape criticism- be skeptical of their “no link”

MacDonald 2007 (Fraser, prof of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies @

University of Melbourne ) “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography” *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5) (2007) pp. 592–615

In post-Cold-War unipolar times the strategic rationale for the United States to maintain the prohibition against weaponizing space is diminishing (Lambakis, 2003), even if the rest of the world wishes it otherwise. In 2000, a UN General Assembly resolution on the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ was adopted by a majority of 163–0 with 3 abstentions: the United States, Israel and the Federated States of Micronesia (United Nations, 2000). Less than two months later, a US Government committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld5 issued a report warning that the ‘relative dependence of the US on space makes its space systems potentially attractive targets’; the United States thus faced the danger, it argued, of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). As space warfare was, according to the report, a ‘virtual certainty’, the United States must ‘ensure continuing superiority’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). This argument was qualified by obligatory gestures towards ‘the peaceful use of outer space’ but the report left little doubt about the direction of American space policy. Any difficult questions about the further militarization (and even weaponization) of space could be easily avoided under the guise of developing ‘dual-use’ (military/civilian) technology and emphasizing the role of military applications in ‘peacekeeping’ operations. Through such rhetoric, NATO’s satellite-guided bombing of a Serbian TV station on 23 April 1999 could have been readily accommodated under the OST injunction to use outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’ (Cervino *et al.*, 2003). Since that time new theatres of operation have been opened up in Afghanistan and Iraq, for further trials of space-enabled warfare that aimed to provide aerial omniscience for the precision delivery of ‘shock and awe’. What Benjamin Lambeth has called the ‘accomplishment’ of air and space power has since been called into question by the all too apparent limitations of satellite intelligence in the tasks of identifying Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction or in stemming the growing number of Allied dead and wounded from modestly armed urban insurgents (Lambeth, 1999; Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2004: 205). For all its limitations, even this imagery has been shielded from independent scrutiny by the military monopolization of commercial satellite outputs (Livingstone and Robinson, 2003). Yet, far from undermining Allied confi dence in satellite imagery or in a ‘cosmic’ view of war (Kaplan, 2006), it is precisely these abstract photocartographies of violence – detached from their visceral and bloodied ‘accomplishments’ – that have licensed, say, the destruction of Fallujah (Gregory, 2004: 162; Graham, 2005b). There remains, of course, a great deal more that can be said about the politics of these aerial perspectives than can be discussed here (see, for instance, Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2006).

Even if the Aff is only concerned with “dual use,” the technology will inevitably be manipulated in the name of security

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Although Galileo has been presented as an infrastructural and commercial asset designed ‘specifically for civilian purposes’, another largely unspoken rationale is undoubtedly EU defence (Wilson, 2002: 5). Galileo will surely underpin a future common European defence policy, even if such a development can be currently subsumed under the guise of ‘dual use’. The European Advisory Group on Aerospace notes that ‘the well being of the [European space] industry depends on twin pillars, namely civil and defence. These are both complementary and mutually dependent’ (quoted in Cervino *et al.*, 2003: 233). The notion of ‘dual use’ is convenient for governments because it mitigates against declining public defence research budgets. But there are, I think, grounds for concern about it in this case. Investment in what seems to be civilian infrastructure can easily become, at the same time, an extension of the militarization and, potentially, the weaponization of space, particularly in an era when warfare is increasingly being couched in ‘humanitarian’ terms. A team of Italian atmospheric scientists have rightly expressed misgivings that the commercial competition in space technology is becoming a de facto arms race that further undermines confidence in UN OST space governance (Cervino *et al.*, 2003).

Link: Space Weapons

Space weapons create a global sovereign, securitizing all life

Duvall & Havercroft 2006 (Raymond, & Jonathan Prof poli sci at Minnesota & Prof of poli sci at U. of British Colombia) “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World”, October, <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/Havercroft_paper.pdf>

This scenario is fascinating for the political logic at work within it—space weapons are required to launch an attack at an otherwise inaccessible target. The three reasons that the target might be inaccessible all have to do with potential gaps in imperial power. Either the defenses of the target country have not been suppressed, or other states have not consented to let the forces fly through their airspace, or other coalition members—presumably in NATO or the UN—have not consented to the action. The first “justification” for the use of the weapon involves clear erasure of the sovereignty of the targeted state, as it eliminates any pretense of that country’s defensibility. The second and third “justifications” diminish, by circumvention, the sovereignty of other states. All three buttress the exclusive capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally in deciding the exception globally. In all three cases, the only practical use for this weapon is in an imperial project! The chief advantage of space weapons is their ability on very short notice to attack a target that is out of reach of conventional forces. What places these targets “out of reach” is the sovereignty of other states as exercised through those states’ abilities to defend their territory, control their airspace, and/or participate (jointly) in authorized decision of the (global) exception. The constitutive effect of these weapons, then, is to strip states of their sovereignty—they are constituted as subjects lacking authorization of decision, and lacking boundary effectively demarcating inside from outside. What modern sovereignty does (as identified in section I. above) is taken from them. Furthermore, given the potential targets that these weapons could destroy, and how they are used, space-based systems are most useful against small groups and individuals. While the purpose of the use of space-based weapons in the above example was to prevent genocide, the means by which this attack was carried out was essentially assassination—the assassination of those driving the vehicle to carry out the ethnic cleansing. Space-based weapons, then, are most useful at targeting individuals and groups on short notice in order to achieve a political objective. We have already seen potential glimpses of this type of warfare in recent years. Consider, for example, that the Iraq War began with a so called “decapitation strike” aimed at assassinating Saddam Hussein in the hope of ending the war before it began. Similar tactics have been used by the Israeli Defense Forces to kill specific leaders of the Palestinians. Also, the U.S. has used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with missiles to target specific members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Placing weapons in space aimed at terrestrial targets would only accelerate the ability to carry out these types of “targeted killings” (a.k.a. assassinations). Space weapons would enable those who control them to kill any person at any point on Earth on extremely short notice. Thus, application of force from outer space would have at least three crucially important constitutive effects. First, it would constitute the possessor of these weapons—presumably the U.S.—as the center of a globally extensive, late-modern empire,68 a sovereign of the globe. But this global sovereign would exercise its power in a new way. Rather than needing to control the land, sea, and airspace of all of the Earth, it could rely on space weapons— because they enable the precise application of force at any point on earth, on short notice— to control the globe. While these weapons are not particularly useful in fighting large-scale wars, or in the conquest of territory, they make such conventional uses of military power moot, in large part. There is no longer a need to exercise sovereign power through the control of territory, all one has to do is kill—or perhaps even threaten to kill—potential adversaries around the world in order to gain one’s wishes. In short, the type of power potentially wielded by such a sovereign would be far more absolute than any encountered throughout history.69 Second, these weapons, just as space-based missile defense was seen above to do, would effectively strip states of their ability to exercise sovereignty over their territories. While de jure sovereignty may remain intact, their de facto sovereignty would be effectively erased. For decades, realist international relations scholars have promoted the idea that states secure their sovereignty through self-help.70 If states lack the capacity to defend themselves from adversaries they are particularly vulnerable to attack and conquest. While other scholars from liberal and constructivist schools of thought have questioned how closely sovereignty is linked to military capability, throughout history states with disproportionate military power have repeatedly violated the sovereignty of weaker states.71 While space-based weapons in and of themselves would not enable conquest of another state, they could be used very effectively to achieve precise political objectives without a credible possibility of retaliation. Imagine what impact these weapons would have on U.S. foreign policy with respect to two of its most pressing objectives at this point in time. Consider, for one, how useful such weapons might be with respect to preventing a rival state such as Iran or North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. While there has been speculation that the U.S. or Israel may launch air strikes against potential nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities in these countries, the logistics—getting access to airspace from neighboring countries, and the possibility of retaliation against military forces in the area—make such operations difficult to carry out. Using weapons in space to conduct such missions would avoid these logistical difficulties, thereby making them easier (and presumably more likely). The threat of using space weapons on either the manufacturing sites of weapons of mass destruction or on the political leadership of an adversary in most cases probably would be sufficient to alter the behaviour of governments. In short, if the U.S. were to deploy such weapons in space, they would likely be used to much the same effect as the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century. A second contemporary policy objective is to fight specific non-state actors. The 9/11 Commission Report discussed in great detail the logistical obstacles that prevented the Clinton administration from capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden.72 The primary obstacle was the difficulty in either launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan through another state’s airspace or deploying U.S. Special Forces in an area so remote from U.S. military bases. Again, had the U.S. had space-based weapons at the time, they probably would have been the weapons of choice. When combined with intelligence about the location of a potential target, they could be used to kill that target on very short notice without violating the air space of other states, or needing to have a military base nearby to offer a support role. In effect, any person or group of people anywhere on Earth could be targeted on very short notice, thereby constituting everyone everywhere as objects of the global sovereign. All would be subject to the rule of the U.S. state. The sovereignty of states would no longer be an obstacle to killing enemies, and these assassinations could be carried out rather easily without the threat of retaliation by the state whose sovereignty has been violated. The example of using space weapons to target non-state actors such as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda points to a third constitutive effect of space weapons. Because these weapons could target anyone, anywhere, at anytime, everyone on the Earth is effectively reduced to “bare life.”73 As Agamben demonstrates in Homo Sacer (1998), one of the constitutive powers of the sovereign is to determine who is outside the laws and protections of the state. While human rights regimes and the rule of law may exist under a late-modern global empire policed by space weapons,74 the global sovereign will have the ability to decide the exception to this rule of law, and this state of exception in many cases may be exercised by the use of space weapons that constituted this sovereign in the first place.

Link- Satellites

Satellites are not neutral- they reinforce dominant security ideologies

Warf 2005 (Barney, prof of Geography, Florida State University) GEOPOLITICS OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY. http://www2.ku.edu/~geography/Docs/Barney%20papers/satellite%20geopolitics.pdf

Third, the paper invokes post-structural analyses of spatial discourses and representations (Wood 1992; Gregory 1994; Cosgrove 2001; Pickles 2003), which underscore the multiple, complex and contingent ways in which spatial knowledge is simultaneously reflective and constitutive of social formations. Because the producers and users of satellite technology are concentrated in Europe and North America, the industry is inescapably intertwined with the Western domination of the global information infrastructure. For example, the world’s largest media companies rely heavily on communications satellites to provide a largely standardised diet of television and video programmes around the world (Myers 1999), what Appadurai (1990) calls a global ‘mediascape’. Clark (1997, p. 126) maintains that globalised satellite broadcasting of television homogenises the viewing options of consumers: Irrespective of where they live, audiences around the world are fed a broadly similar diet of television. The same kind of programmes are scheduled at the same times of the day . . . Soap operas and quiz shows account for most of the daytime slots while children’s programmes predominate in the early evening. These are followed by family viewing, the mid-evening news, drama, sport and adult television. The significance of this standard format is that it generates demand for particular types of programming, much of which is international in origin. Satellites images comprise what Lefebvre (1974) famously calls representations of space through which dominant ideologies are expressed and naturalised. Cosgrove (1994) argued that far from comprising politically neutral representations, satellite photography legitimated and sustained a discourse of ‘one earth’ effectively encompassed by one country, the United States. Finally, Litfin (1997) maintains satellites are inherently masculinist in sustaining the view of a single, dispassionate, all-knowing Cartesian observer.

Link- Asteroids

Asteroid narratives rely on the politics of fear to further the logic of security. The 1AC impacts cannot be separated from the drive to securitize.

Mellor 2007, felicity,Prof @– Imperial College (London), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space.” Social Studies of Science Vol. 37, No. 4 (Aug., 2007), pp. 499-531

Since the late 1980s, a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists has repeatedly warned of the threat of an asteroid impacting with Earth and causing global destruction. They foretell a large impact causing global fires, the failure of the world’s agriculture and the end of human civilization. But, these scientists assure us, we live at a unique moment in history when we have the technological means to avert disaster. They call for support for dedicated astronomical surveys of near-Earth objects to provide early warning of an impactor and they have regularly met with defence scientists to discuss new technologies to deflect any incoming asteroids. The scientists who have promoted the asteroid impact threat have done so by invoking narratives of technological salvation – stories which, like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), promise security through a superweapon in space. The asteroid impact threat can therefore be located within the broader cultural history of fantasies about security and power, which, Bruce Franklin (1988) has argued, is inextricably linked to the century-old idea that a new superweapon could deliver world peace. Howard McCurdy (1997: 78–82), in his study of the ways in which the US space programme was shaped by popular culture, has suggested that the promotion of the impact threat can be seen as the completion of Cold War fantasies, which had used a politics of fear to justify space exploration.

**The 1AC is not an objective, scientific fact. It is the same political narrative with Asteroids taking the place of the enemy to justify securitization**

Mellor 2007, felicity,Prof @– Imperial College (London), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space.” Social Studies of Science Vol. 37, No. 4 (Aug., 2007), pp. 499-531

The asteroid impact threat was thus articulated within a narrative context that was closely aligned to science fiction and was shared by both civilian scientists and defence experts. As Veronica Hollinger (2000: 216–17) has noted, traditional science fiction is driven by an Aristotelian plot characterized by ‘a valorisation of the logic of cause and effect’. Impact narratives conformed to this traditional narrative logic: asteroids and scientists act by causing a series of events to unfold, from the approach of an asteroid and recognition of the threat through attempts at technological mitigation to resolution in salvation. These narratives configured asteroids as acting agents in human affairs and brought to asteroid science a structure in which human agents (and their technological proxies) solve the problem posed in the narrative and in so doing achieve closure. Allusions to impact narratives implied a direction and human-centredness to events that, once the narratives had been evoked, could not easily be suppressed. Despite their attempts to distance themselves from the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists experienced a ‘narrative imperative’ that drew them towards the same technologized ends as those promoting SDI. A sense of narrative agency was evoked even in texts that were not primarily narratival. Crucially, asteroids were no longer seen as signifiers of the mathematically exacting Newtonian system, distant objects moving through the empty backdrop of space. Rather, they were configured as proximate beasts, acting subjects that could turn against humanity at any moment. Thus in their many popular books on the subject, the scientists described asteroids as belonging to a ‘menagerie’ or a ‘cosmic zoo’ (Steel, 2000a: 120); they were ‘menacing’ (Kring, 2000: 171) and had ‘teeth’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 154); they were ‘global killers’ (Lewis, 1997: 209) that could unleash ‘ferocious assaults’ (Steel, 1995: 247) on the Earth; they were the ‘enemy’ (Steel, 2000a: 153). Likewise, in their paper in Nature, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 33) stated that Earth ‘resides in a swarm of asteroids’. The construction of asteroids as the enemy was accompanied by a range of other militaristic metaphors. In the popular books, asteroids became ‘missiles’, ‘pieces of ordnance’ or ‘stealth weapons’ (Lewis, 1997: 37), which bombard the Earth with a ‘death-dealing fusillade’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 7). In a technical paper, too, they were construed as ‘astral assailant[s]’ (Simonenko et al., 1994: 929). Where the military and the politicians talked of rogue states,27 the scientists talked of ‘rogue asteroids’ (Steel, 1995; Ailor, 2004: 3). This analogy was further reinforced by the construction of scenarios in which a small impact might be mistaken for the detonation of a nuclear warhead. One technical paper speculated on what would have happened during the first Gulf War if an atmospheric explosion that had been caused by a meteor burning up over the Pacific had actually occurred over Baghdad or Israel (Tagliaferri et al., 1994). The authors suggested that such an event would have been mistaken for a missile detonation by the opposing state. In such scenarios, the actions of interplanetary bodies were not just compared with those of rogue states but came to be identified with them. With the swarming asteroids filling space, space itself was also resignified. What had been an abstract mathematical space became a narrative place, the location where particular and contingent events occurred. Although the scientists continued to appeal to the predictability of celestial dynamics – it was this that would enable a survey of near-Earth objects to identify any that might pose a threat – they also noted that chaotic processes disturbed the orbits of comets and also, to a lesser degree, asteroids (for example, Yeomans & Chodas, 1994; Milani et al., 2000). The inherent unpredictability of the orbits was enhanced by the current state of scientific uncertainty. These chaotic and uncertain processes were projected onto space itself, construed as a place of random violence. In the popular books, the Solar System became a ‘dangerous cosmic neighbourhood’ (Sumners & Allen, 2000b: 3), ‘a capricious, violent place’ (Verschuur, 1996: 217), a place of ‘mindless violence’ (Verschuur, 1996: 18) and ‘wanton destruction’ (Levy, 1998: 13). Even in a peer-reviewed paper, Chapman (2004: 1) described space as a ‘cosmic shooting gallery’. Despite the agency attributed to the asteroids themselves, in the narratives of technological salvation it was the human agents, acting through new technologies, who moved the narratives forward. Narrative progression was thus generated through an assumption of technological progress. Through technology, humans intervene in space and become agents of cosmic events. The scientists’ promotion of the impact threat shared this assumption of technological progress. Like the US Air Force study, their technical papers on mitigation systems considered speculative technologies such as solar sails and mass drivers as well as more established explosive technologies (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992; Melosh & Nemchinov, 1993; Ivashkin & Smirnov, 1995; Gritzner & Kahle, 2004). Even those scientists who warned that it was too early to draw up detailed blueprints of interception technologies accepted the narratival implication that there was a problem that needed addressing, that the problem could be addressed by human action, and that this action would involve a technological solution. Technology, in this picture, was configured as inherently progressive. As Morrison & Teller (1994: 1137) put it: ‘The development of technology in the past few centuries has been towards increasing understanding and control of natural forces in an effort to improve human life.’ Those scientists who argued against the immediate development of mitigation technology shared with its proponents a belief in the inexorable progress of technology. Future generations, they argued, would be better equipped than we ar

Impacts – Value to Life

Securitization necessitates a view of subjectivity that reduces life to a thing and authorizes limitless violence on Others – The result is a permanent state of war that exceeds the aff impacts

Gorrelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, where he holds a Presidential Fellowship. Theory & Event, Volume 11, Issue 2 “Imagining Extraordinary Renditions” 2008. Project Muse AD 7/29/09)

But if torture operates as a metaphor for brutal, authoritarian statism, this is so because it speaks to an entire epistemology of security wherein the life of the individual is only valuable insofar as it maintains some utility for the biopolitical population of which it is a part. The population, increasingly in need of protection from the disorderly world of threats, is harnessed in opposition to its dangerous others. This is particularly true for the war on terror; as Giorgio Agamben warned immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic."32 Aimé Césaire noted this phenomenon in his articulation of the full brutality of colonialism, and in his equation, "colonization = thingification"; as extraordinary rendition demonstrates, the total securitization of everyday life, like colonization, conceptually transforms people into objects through (and against) which to define state authority.33 This radical objectification manifests as "force, brutality, cruelty, sadism... forced labor, intimidation, pressure... contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses."34 Yet, as Césaire demonstrates, this "thingification" of life is not an accidental byproduct of European liberal humanism. Instead, the worst forms of violence are, in a very real sense, necessitated by the Enlightenment and the western metaphysical tradition of which it is a product. In Césaire's words, "through the mouths of the Sarrauts and the Bardes, the Mullers and the Renans, through the mouths of all those who considered -- and consider -- it lawful to apply to non-European peoples 'a kind of expropriation for public purposes' for the benefit of nations that were stronger and better equipped, it was already Hitler speaking!"35 Moreover, as Césaire and many other colonial and post-colonial thinkers suggest, the cultivation of the fundamental unit of political and moral account -- the sovereign subject -necessitates an other against which to define legitimate subjectivity. The other is constituted in opposition to everything that the sovereign, rational, autonomous self supposedly is not. The irrational other, thus devalued, can be abused, erased or exterminated with impunity.

The product of securitization is a life without value – it creates the tyranny of the herd, and an inability to affirm life.

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09)

This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security:

- My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. [45](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note45)

The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." [46](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note46) Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak  in a series of rhetorical questions.

Impacts – Value to Life

The language of security reduces our lives to hollow shells, protected from the risk of “death by difference”, but unable to find a reason to live

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/10/09) j

As a speech act, security is about specifying, through discourse, the permitted conditions under which acts that "secure" the state can take place. In a world of relatively autonomous states, with low levels of interaction, it is possible to draw the conceptual boundaries that establish difference between two states and that also define a range of permitted behavior and beliefs. Specifying the goals of other states' behaviors, as friendly or hostile, could also be a part of this boundary-drawing. Whether we accept such boundary definition as justifiable or not is beside the point; the state is clearly the referent  of security as speech act and as behavior.

The most secure state is, under these conditions, the one most successful in excluding outside influences by drawing boundaries that can be secured; in Barry Buzan's terms, a "closed" state. But, as Buzan's analysis suggests, a closed state is either very sure of itself and its purpose in the world, or very insecure about its viability. [7](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note7) It is either very confident of its ability to ward off the efforts of others to penetrate it, and very sure that it has the undying loyalty of its citizens, so that no social and economic intercourse is desirable or necessary. Or, it is so weak and insecure that, as in the case of North Korea, closure is the only way to ensure that the state and its citizens will not be subverted and "turned" by external influences. Major difficulties arise when the referent of security becomes less clear. We can maintain the state as the referent of security, the speech act, but in doing so we may be muddying the waters. Indeed, the very notion of the state becomes problematic: On the one hand, it is assumed to be an independent and autonomous political entity that fulfills a particular set of constitutive characteristics codified in part in the Treaties of Augsberg and Westphalia; on the other hand, it is quite evident that the state of 1995 is not the same as the state of 1648. Giving the name "state" to particular political entities at a particular time does not mean that they meet the complete, idealized set of constitutive requirements imagined to apply at another time. [8](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note8) Consequently, applying unchanging concepts or practices to these entities, or to others that we might choose to define, does not mean that the logic of security follows today as it once did, either 30 or 300 years ago. Closure is, consequently, a formula for poverty and destitution, as both Buzan and Beverly Crawford make clear. The citizens of such states are wont to escape their security in the interest of finding better lives and more "secure" livelihoods. Left behind is a hollow shell, less and less able to secure itself. For different reasons, open states are subject to much the same logic: As they engage in extensive social and economic intercourse, the boundaries separating one state from another become, more and more, lines on a map and, perhaps, lines on the ground, but lines that become quite unclear in the minds of citizens whose routines involve living in culturally diffuse "borderlands" that may, geographically, be quite distant from the lines on the ground. Security, under these circumstances, is about the drawing and defense of lines and boundaries, about limits, and about exclusion and, in this sense, it is the quintessential "speech act" described by Ole Wæver.

This militarism paints human existence as nothing more than war and individuals are essentially agents of violence

Marzec 9 (Robert P., Associate Professor of English literature and postcolonial studies at Purdue University, and associate editor of Modern Fiction Studies. The Global South, Volume 3, Number 1, “Militariality” Spring 2009. Project Muse AD 7/9/09)

These stratocratic controls of planetary human activity reveal more than the ideology of a single administration; they are an extension of what we can now see as the complete devotion to an apparatus that captures all cultural and political energies in terms of what Clausewitz defined as “policy.” The original state of “emergency” as defined by the Bush Administration in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks has been naturalized and sedimented as to become a fundamental starting point of human existence. Consequently, understanding the full intensity of the age of militariality requires more than the common critical awareness of Clausewitz’s central doctrine: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means” (28). It requires first an understanding that for Clausewitz, war is the very ontological basis of human existence, a basis that transcends culture, history and temporality. War defines the very structure of human subjectivity, a juridico-natural “code of law” that is “deeply rooted” in a people, an army, a government: “war is a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy” (30). Clausewitz assigns a constituency to each of the registers of this trinity: “The first of these…mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government” (30). In a totalizing problematic organized according to the idea of war serving as the basis of human existence, the people of a nation are equated with that of a blind primordial force of violence: “the first,” which refers to “primordial vio- lence, hatred, and enmity” identifies the people living in the nation. “Government” therefore names that entity constituted for the exclusive purpose of controlling its unstable citizenry by reorienting the energies of the people to- wards warfare. This reorientation lays the groundwork and delineates the horizon of human creativity, and determines the single legitimized space of freedom: the army, where the “creative spirit is free to roam.” The space of in- stability, of chance, which is the condition for the possibility of creativity, en- ters into the war-footing picture of reality only on this register of militarized human activity. This connection here is not a matter of association; military activity defines the very essence of freedom and human creativity. The army and its state are not defined in this picture in traditional terms of democracy, protection, and service to a people. Nor are they the a sign of the discourse of biopower, for biopower has its eyes on the productivity of a population and functions according to a general administration of life that, although affecting “distributions around a norm,” still invites and produces a certain amount of heterogeneity (Foucault 266).

Impacts – Value to Life

The drive toward security causes no value to life – We live life in our seatbelts instead of embracing the unknown which gives meaning to our lives. Their method only locks us in a cycle of violence and counter-violence

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09)

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear  that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" [37](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note37)

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual  explanations. [38](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note38)

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." [39](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note39)

The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security  such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." [40](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note40) For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing  something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." [41](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note41)

Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors:

The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back  with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt  that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tr

Impacts – Value to Life

Deriving politics from security destroys value to life.

McWilliams 7 (Wilson, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, “Power After Power: Reflections on Liberalism in Politics and Vision,” Theory & Event, 10(1), AD: 7-9-9)

Begin with the proposition that liberal politics derives from fearfulness, the impulse to preserve life and avoid pain and the corresponding desire for security and comfort. Human beings enter society precisely as part of an "escape from freedom," as Gouvernor Morris told the Convention: "the savage State was more favorable to liberty than the Civilized...It was preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for property."46 Liberty, for model liberal citizens, is in part burdensome and inconvenient; they prefer caution to daring and their conduct is "modest and unheroic" (296). Politically "desensitized" (429), they agree with Hamilton's assertion that the "bright talents and exalted endowments" associated with ancient cities are not worth the price of the turbulent politics of the polis.47 They are hesitant even to defend their rights, as Locke was at some pains to indicate, hard to move toward change, more disposed to suffer than to run the risk of resistance and likely to act only after "a long train of abuses."48 31. Leaving the State of Nature, in other words, involves a measure of slavishness, a barter of liberty for safety and support that is partly disguised and made tolerable for liberals to the extent that it is not - as Leviathan is - a submission to some one: it is slavishness without a master.49 Political society is always a questionable bargain, a matter of "selling out" in which the price is always open to question, and nowhere more than in liberal souls.

The irony of security is that it delivers what it seeks to prevent. Reducing the value to life to mere existence causes cycles of violence that end in extinction.

Dillon 96 (Michael, “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, http://www.questia.com/read/103092657?title=Politics%20of%20Security:%20Towards%20a%20Political%20Philosophy%20of%20Continental%20Thought#, AD: 7/10/9)

One has one’s being to be. The struggle in life is, therefore, simply a struggle for life. Much less is it a struggle between antecedently determined and conflictual features of human being. Rather, it is instead the struggle of life with its being, the striving of the striving to take-up that which it undergoes; the struggle of its occupation of, and its pre-occupation with and within, the freedom of its very being there. This is not human being’s struggle to be, therefore, but, always already being, the struggle which the being of human being’s freedom to be entails. Here, Heidegger’s understanding of being in the free, active and verbal sense comes across most strongly. For where there is a life comprised by, and in virtue of, difference, there is always struggle less between its free constitutent parts as of this manifold openness with and within the freedom, marked by the ontological difference, into which it is thrown. A being that bears this difference as its free composition is a being which is continuously in danger of being overwhelmed by the violence into which that difference may degenerate. For violence incites reprisal and there is no necessary end to the cycle of violence which results, short of the extinction of human being. There is no principle of ‘guaranteed effectiveness’, as Girard puts it, for quelling violence. Only violence, it seems, can secure an end to violence, yet not even violence can do that securely because violence, of course, begets violence.

Impacts – Root of War

Their security thinking intrinsically produces in-group thinking that necessitates violence against an out-group – This is the root cause of war

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/28/09)

Much of the analysis that currently purports to explain these wars revolves around the concepts of ethnicity and sectarianism : Increasingly, groups of people are defining themselves collectively, relative to others, in terms of certain shared or acquired characteristics such as appearance, religion, history, origins, language, and so on. This is not something new, of course; the very ideas of nationalism and the nation-state are based on such differences. But analyses based on the construction and application of ethnicity generally ignore the importance of the Other --whom one is not--in fostering the sense of collective identity so important to action centered on ethnicity or sectarianism. 11   
 Defining oneself in such terms requires defining someone else in different terms; differentiation thus draws a boundary between the self and the Other. This Other is not, at first, necessarily a threat in terms of one's own continued existence, although ethnicity can and does become securitized. 12 But the peaceful acceptance of an Other requires that boundaries be drawn somewhere else, and that security, the speech act, specify another Other (as in, for example, South Slavs against the Hapsburgs, or Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union). There are always implicit risks in the peaceful acceptance of an Other as a legitimate ontology, because doing so raises the possibility, however remote, of accepting the Other's characteristics as a legitimate alternative and, consequently, of being taken over by the Other. Given this epistemology of threats, it does not take much to be "turned." 13 How else to account for the life and death character of the distinctions among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, which the untutored eye can hardly detect? 14 As James Der Derian puts it in his contribution to this volume, "The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable."

Crisis-driven politics obscures the systemic roots of conflict

Cuomo 96 (Chris J., Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Cincinnati. Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4, Women and Violence, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Autumn 1996. JSTOR AD 7/9/09)

Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

Impacts – Endless Violence

The logic of the insecurity means perpetual failure in the search for securing the globe – The end point is the entire world becomes an enemy as a means of retaining our innocence

Chernus 1 (Ira, PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER,

“FIGHTING TERROR IN THE NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm, AD: 7/10/09)

In the national insecurity state, stability depends on global control. So the inevitable failure to gain full control will become further evidence of eternal instability, hence eternal peril. When allies are alienated by U.S. policies and refuse to cooperate fully in the war, that will become further evidence that the world is indeed a dangerous place, demanding more strenuous efforts at control. When U.S. actions provoke violent counter-actions, that will be seen, not as the inevitable give-and-take of war, but as further evidence of implacable hatred, not of what we do, but of what we are. Within the framework of the national insecurity state, the only available response is to proclaim anew our innocence and redouble efforts at stability and security, which means imposing greater control. Thus the spiral of violence grows higher. Every possible outcome of U.S. policies will end up confirming the premise of permanent insecurity.

Beyond these certainties lies the possibility of another Vietnam. The potential enemy nations have all learned the lesson of Vietnam. If attacked, their populace would take to the hills, or the urban skyscrapers, and wage guerilla war. U.S. strategists would be strongly tempted to erase the line between enemy soldiers and civilians. The Bush administration took a first step in this direction when it claimed the right to attack not only terrorists, but whole states. From the first, this claim met great skepticism outside the U.S. Even within this country, there is widespread awareness that most civilians everywhere oppose terrorism. There is a widespread demand to have only terrorists, not innocent civilians, attacked.

Security tactics motivates “war without limits” and a normalization of militarism.

Giroux 6 (Henry A., Masters degree from Appalachian State University, and received his doctorate from Carnegie-Mellon University, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University. Symploke 14.1/2, “The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: PolItical Culture Under the Bush/Chaney Administration” 2006. Project Muse AD 7/9/09)

Popular fears about domestic safety and internal threats accentuated by endless terror alerts have created a society that increasingly accepts the notion of a "war without limits" as a normal state of affairs. But fear and insecurity do more than produce a collective anxiety among Americans, exploited largely to get them to believe that they should vote Republican because it is the only political party that can protect them. In addition to producing manufactured political loyalty, such fears can also be manipulated into a kind of "war fever." The mobilization of war fever, intensified through a politics of fear, carries with it a kind of paranoid edge, endlessly stoked by government alerts and repressive laws and used "to create the most extensive national security apparatus in our nation's history" (Rosen 2003b, para. 5). It is also reproduced in the Foxified media, which, in addition to constantly marketing the flag and interminably implying that critics of American foreign policy are traitors, offer up seemingly endless images of brave troops on the front line, heroic stories of released American prisoners, and utterly privatized commentaries on those wounded or killed in battle. Time Magazine embodied this representational indulgence in military culture by naming "The American Soldier" as the "Person of the Year" for 2003. Not only have such ongoing and largely uncritical depictions of war injected a constant military presence in American life, they have also helped to create a civil society that has become more aggressive in its warlike enthusiasms. But there is more at work here than either the exploitation of troops for higher ratings or an attempt by right-wing political strategists to keep the American public in a state of permanent fear so as to remove pressing domestic issues from public debate. There is also the attempt by the Bush administration to convince as many Americans as possible that under the current "state of emergency" the use of the military internally in domestic affairs is perfectly acceptable, evident in the increasing propensity to use the military establishment "to incarcerate and interrogate suspected terrorists and 'enemy combatants' and keep them beyond the reach of the civilian judicial system, even if they are American citizens" (R. Kohn 174-175). It is also evident in the federal government's attempt to try terrorists in military courts, and to detain prisoners "outside the provisions of the Geneva Convention as prisoners of war . . . at the U.S. [End Page 126] Marine Corps base at Guantanamo, Cuba because that facility is outside of the reach of the American courts" (R. Kohn 174-5).

Impacts – Endless Violence

Security makes war inevitable – The only option to gain power is to take it from other countries in the name of “safety”

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09)

In chapter 10 of the Leviathan , Hobbes opens with the proposition that "The Power of a Man . . . is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good." [22](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note22) Harmless enough, it would seem, until this power is put into relation with other men seeking future goods. Conflict inevitably follows, "because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another." [23](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note23) A man's power comes to rest on his eminence , the margin of power that he is able to exercise over others. The classic formulation follows in chapter 11: "So that in the first place, I put a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death." [24](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note24) The implications for interpersonal and interstate relations are obvious. Without a common power to constrain this perpetual struggle there can be no common law: "And Convenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." [25](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note25) In the state of nature there exists a fundamental imbalance between man's needs and his capacity to satisfy them--with the most basic need being security from a violent and sudden death. To avoid injury from one another and from foreign invasion, men "conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that man reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, into one Will." [26](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note26) The constitution of the Leviathan, the sovereign state, provides for a domestic peace, but at a price. Hobbes's solution for civil war displaces the disposition for a "warre of every man against every man" to the international arena. [27](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note27) Out of fear, for gain, or in the pursuit of glory, states will go to war because they can. Like men in the precontractual state of nature, they seek the margin of power that will secure their right of self-preservation--and run up against states acting out of similar needs and desires.

In these passages we can discern the ontotheological foundations of an epistemic realism, in the sense of an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things. [28](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note28) The sovereign state and territoriality become the necessary effects of anarchy, contingency, disorder that are assumed to exist independent  of and prior  to any rational or linguistic conception of them. In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity. The irony, perhaps even tragedy, is that by constituting the first science of security, Hobbes made a singular contribution to the eventual subversion of the metaphysical foundations of solidarity.

Impacts – Endless Violence

The innocence the affirmative preserves keeps us from re-evaluating failed policies – This authorizes infinite violence

Chernus 1 (Ira, PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER,

“FIGHTING TERROR IN THE NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm, AD: 7/10/09)

The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence.

The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out.

The logic of the insecurity state short-circuits any attempt at change - it uses it’s own failed logic to justify murderous policy.

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“FIGHTING TERROR IN THE NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm, AD: 7/10/09) jl

But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all.

The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into the national insecurity state.

The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone. Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks.

The first response was the nearly universal cry: "Pearl Harbor." But "this was not Pearl Harbor," as National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice recognized. There is no rivalry between great nation states. No foreign nation has attacked the U.S. No long-standing diplomatic and economic maneuvering preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001. Why, then, did they so quickly evoke the imagery of December 7, 1941? The common thread was not a hope for redemption, but only a conviction that the nation’s very existence was threatened.

In 2001, that judgment is debatable, to say the least. Assuming that the attacks were indeed the work of a Muslim splinter group, such groups have been trying to attack U.S. interests for a quarter-century or more. One massive act of destruction, as horrendous as it was, hardly constitutes evidence of their overwhelming power. Nor is there any real evidence for Bush’s charge that these groups aim to impose their "radical beliefs on people everywhere¼ and end a way of life." Yet evidence is irrelevant in the national insecurity state. The fear comes first, before any evidence that it is warranted. How do we know that our existence is threatened? Because it is so obviously threatened!

Impacts – Genocide

Security justifies war and genocide

Campbell and Dillon 93 (David and Michael, Assistant Professor in Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University and Senior Lecurer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, “The Political Subject of Violence,” http://books.google.com/books?id=6kS8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA97&lpg=PA97&dq=review+of+michael+dillon's+politics+of+security&source=bl&ots=dxyRyld\_LJ&sig=q1QwCTHyCz5CmTM1gNxny6iWBQo&hl=en&ei=qbZXSoT0AZDQtgP5q-XWBg&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=10, AD:7/10/9)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of ‘security’. In its name peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from vicissitudes of nature – as well as from other gods, emperors, and foreign states. In its name weapons of mass destruction have been developed which transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in IR, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an onto- theology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida ‘as a series of substitutions of center for center’ in a perpetual search for the ‘transcendental signified’. From God to Rataional Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People – and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it – the security of the centre has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the centre, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything – transportation, capital and information flows, change itself – have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said – that is, until the 1992 election went into full swing - “The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is unstability.’

Impacts – Genocide

Their security threats demand constant surveillance and total control over so-called threatening identities – Rogue regimes, terrorists, hackers etc become bogeys to be eradicated. The empirical result is atrocities

Tuathail 96 [Gearoid O. Prof. of Gov’t and Intergovernmental Affairs – VA Tech. “At the End of Geopolitics?” http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/publish/papers/end.htm AD 07/10/09]

A complex postmodern geopolitics entwining territory, media and machines was evident in the U.S. cruise missile attacks against Iraq in September 1996. The latest version of the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile used in these attacks (made by the GM owned Hughes Aircraft Company at an estimated cost of $1 million apiece) employed not only a supposedly improved terrain "scene-matching" computer but also a complementary guidance system that used satellites to continually update the missile's location and target. (Many of the missiles still missed!). The unusual geopolitics of these attacks -- the use of drone weapons launched by warships in international waters and by B-52's based in Guam, a 20 hour flight away -- was necessitated both by territorial limits in the region, diplomatic restrictions on the use of airbases in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and televisual limits at home, the Clinton administration's fear of the spectacle of U.S. military casualties in the run-up to a presidential election. The geopolitics of vision, in this case, was triangulated by technology, territory and television. A second cluster of postmodern geopolitics is that emerging from the efforts of intellectuals and institutions of statecraft to re-map the global strategic landscape after the Cold War. While the crude Manichean world of the Cold War may be gone for now, the preoccupation of the national security establishment with "rogue states and nuclear outlaws" is indicative of a persistent territorial conceptualization of danger in international security studies. Underwriting these territorializing specifications of danger are, of course, old-fashioned essentialist identities -- totalitarian states, Islamic fundamentalists, die-hard Communists, terrorists, criminals and devils (like Saddam Hussein) -- and a longstanding strategic commitment on the part of the Western security apparatus to pro-Western states like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The effort of NATO to extend this zone of strategic commitment and protection in Central Europe is evidence that a state-centric territorial geopolitics does persist, but increasingly it is also non-territorial "postmodern terrorist" threats in a speeding hybrid world that preoccupy the defense planners in the Pentagon, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and elsewhere. Threats from contraband flows and proliferations -- the spread of nuclear weapons, plutonium, terrorists, drugs, illegal migrants, infectious diseases, money laundering, sensitive high-tech assets, biological and chemical agents, etc. -- and threats to vital official flows and ports -- oil pipelines, subways, world trading centers, airports, teleports, secret data archives, fiber-optic lines, international financial networks, and global sporting spectacles -- have brought into being a postmodern geopolitics of security where the geographies are in fluid flowmations not fixed formations. Ostensibly preoccupied by a geography of territorial fixities during the Cold War, security discourse has expanded to encompass the protection of fundamental spaces of flows from material attack or the immaterial terrorism of computer hackers and software viruses. The creation of a Belfast-style "ring of steel" and CCTV system around the City of London -- a strategic space of financial flows -- and the militarization of U.S. airports in response to recent spectacular bombings disclose a geopolitics that mixes traditional forms of containment and detainment with new panoptic surveillance and scanning technologies. Again, media vectors are also implicated in the creation of these landscapes, one of their "strategic" functions being the simulation of security and the containment of media borne viruses of panic and hysteria.

Impacts – Genocide

The construction of the dangerous Other mobilizes the populace and legitimizes violence in the name of security.

Tsoukala 8 (Anastassia, Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of Paris V, “Boundary-creating Processes and the Social Construction of Threat, Alternatives, 33(2), AD: 7-8-9)

Despite their differences, the two principal moral-panics models, elaborated by Cohen and Goode and Ben-Yehuda, present similarities that are to a large extent shared by many analyses of the construction of political enemies.23 First, though the focus may change significantly from one model to another, there are no divergent views as to the identity of the actors involved in that process. Then, when it comes to defining the objective of that process, the construction of social enemies is seen as essential to the defining of the mainstream society and to fostering social bonds. As Jef Huysmans has put it, threat definition creates a self and an other in a process in which the definition of the self depends on the definition of the other.24 The members of the mainstream society and the values they share are better defined through an oppositional pattern, according to which their attributes are shaped in negative rather than positive terms; that is, through the constant confrontation with what they are not. The "other," as the necessary conceptual boundary and, at the same time, inversed mirror of the community's ideal image, becomes then the condition sine qua non of the very existence of that image. In other words, good, virtue, and beauty cannot possibly exist without evil, vice, and ugliness. This ordinary defining process is strengthened in times of crisis when the community and/or its values are, or are thought to be, in danger. Never do the members of a community feel closer to each other than when called to face a common threat to their shared values. Besides, the very process of getting closer strengthens the internal cohesion of the group in that it presumes a wide sharing of common values or, at least, imposes it de facto as a taken-for-granted reality. Differences then have to be forgotten or disregarded as if they had never existed. At the same time, this transnational and to some extent atemporal consensus-making process through the designation of moral boundaries cannot be dissociated from an array of spatially and temporally definable political, bureaucratic, and economic stakes.25 While politicians may seek to strengthen their position in the political and security realms by opposing themselves to the social enemies of the day, security professionals may associate their preventive and coercive policies with budget claims and/or the ongoing repositioning of their agencies in the security field, and sensationalist media campaigns guarantee an economically quantifiable rise in their audience. When it comes to analyzing the way these social outcasts are created, it is acknowledged that their efficient exclusion from mainstream society rests upon a rupturing process, liable to draw a clear line between the perpetrator of the allegedly threatening acts and the rest of the community,26 as part of a process of establishing guilt.27 This boundary-creating process allows, moreover, the expulsion of all the moral ambiguity from the measures to be adopted against the wrongdoers and from the values thus defended. It is the exclusion of the other from the mainstream society that makes possible the unreserved implementation on him or her of a series of coercive measures, going from various control devices to detention, torture, and even death.28 It is the symbolic banning of the other from the community that legitimizes the imposition on the other of numerous privacy-intrusive proactive measures, in the name of the protection from the probable future risk he or she is believed to represent for the common well-being. The doubt-dispelling binary logic this exclusion rests upon is also a useful hegemonic device that simplifies complex issues. In setting up the other as a "hypersignifier of all that is bad and immoral,"29 it hushes the complex causes of their actions and, hence, avoids putting any possible blame on the mainstream society.

Creating a boundary between social groups allows for scapegoating of the Other.

Tsoukala 8 (Anastassia, Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of Paris V, “Boundary-creating Processes and the Social Construction of Threat, Alternatives, 33(2), AD: 7-8-9)

In his analysis of the social construction of political enemies, Murray Edelman sums up prior academic knowledge to highlight the way the boundary-creating process is embedded in the broader process of constructing social enemies.^ First, it is presumed that the members of the target group are malign and immoral. These allegedly inbuilt features are then associated with current social, economic, or political problems to suggest that the members of the target group are the source or, at least, one of the aggravating factors of, those problems. Once established, this association transforms the way the target group is represented. Henceforth, its re

Impacts – Self-fulfilling Prophecy

The rhetoric of the affirmative leads to perpetual enemies against whom we must defend our “security”.

Chernus 1 (Ira, PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER, “FIGHTING TERROR IN THE NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm, AD: 7/27/09)

The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence.  
The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out.   
It is not surprising, then, that the pattern of insecurity crystallized during the cold war survived that war. The "experts" insisted that now we were less secure. September 11 proved them indisputably right. Now they offer an official story that pretends to see an end to insecurity, but actually promises the endless insecurity of another cold war. And the policies based on that story virtually guarantee that the promise will be fulfilled.  
But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all.   
The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into the national insecurity state.  
The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone. Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks.

Securitization results in an endless search for another, preserving the need for security.

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/27/09)

As James Der Derian puts it in his contribution to this volume, "The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable." 15

The loss of an Enemy can be seen, therefore, as something of a catastrophe for an identity based on that Enemy, and it opens up a search for a new Other that can function as the new Enemy. And, make no mistake about it: While the myths underlying American identity are many, during the Cold War the strongest one had to do with not-being, and not-becoming, Communist, both individually and collectively. In a world dominated by Great Powers and balance-of-power politics, as was the case prior to World War II, losing one enemy was not a problem; there were others to be found. In the post-bipolar world, the search for enemies and new security threats is less easily solved, inasmuch as the disappearance of the only Other that counts leaves no other Others that can

Impacts – Self-fulfilling Prophecy

The pursuit of security leads to more perceptions of insecurity, trapping those involved in an endless loop of securitization

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/27/09)

The search for new rationales for security leads, as Beverly Crawford's essay suggests, not to security redefined but to endless iterative loops. To be secure, we must become more self-reliant, inasmuch as to be reliant means depending on others who are potential Others. To depend on others means that they are more competitive than we are. To be less competitive means our survival may be threatened. But to be less reliant means that we forego the fruits of technological collaboration with others. To forego the fruits of collaboration means that we become less competitive, poorer and less secure than others might be. If we are poorer and less secure, we are more open to penetration by others, who might well take us over. If we were more like the Japanese, we would be the equal of Japan and secure; but if we were more like the Japanese, we would be less like Americans and therefore insecure. And so on through this new Hall of Mirrors. The "new economic security dilemma" is more of a contradiction than a dilemma. While U.S. policymakers fret over competition, U.S. corporations establish strategic alliances with their Japanese counterparts.

To put this another way, and as I suggested above, there are no security dilemmas in the globalized economy, although there are likely to be security dilemmas in economic globalization. As Barry Buzan puts it,

There is little reason to think that the capitalist coalition will succumb to the Leninist fate of falling into conflict over the redivision of the global market now that its external challenger has been seen off. Economic competition there will doubtless be, possibly quite fierce, as global surplus capacity in many industries begins to bite. But their prosperity and their economic processes are now so deeply interdependent that the costs of full-blown mercantilism act as an effective deterrent.

Impacts – Self-fulfilling Prophecy

The belief that violence and aggression are inevitable creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that will lead us to extinction. Humans aren’t violent by nature, we choose to be.

Kohn 88 (Alfie, writes and speaks widely on human behavior, education, and parenting, “Human Nature Isn’t Inherently Violent,” <http://salsa.net/peace/conv/8weekconv1-4.html>, AD: 7-11-09)

It is true that the presence of some hormones or the stimulation of certain sections of the brain has been experimentally linked with aggression. But after describing these mechanisms in some detail, K.E. Moyer, a physiologist at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, emphasizes that "aggressive behavior is stimulus-bound. That is, even though the neural system specific to a particular kind of aggression is well activated, the behavior does not occur unless an appropriate target is available (and even then) it can be inhibited."

Regardless of the evolutionary or neurological factors said to underlie aggression, "biological" simply does not mean "unavoidable." The fact that people voluntarily fast or remain celibate shows that even hunger and sex drives can be overridden.

All this concerns the matter of aggressiveness in general. The idea that war in particular is biologically determined is even more far-fetched.

To begin with, we tend to make generalizations about the whole species on the basis of our own experience. "People in a highly warlike society are likely to overestimate the propensity toward war in human nature," says Donald Greenberg, a sociologist at the University of Missouri.

The historical record, according to the Congressional Research Service, shows the United States is one of the most warlike societies on the planet, having intervened militarily around the world more than 150 times since 1850. Within such a society, not surprisingly, the intellectual traditions supporting the view that aggression is more a function of nature than nurture have found a ready audience. The mass media also play a significant role in perpetuating outdated views on violence, according to Jeffrey Goldstein, a psychologist at Temple University.

Because it is relatively easy to describe and makes for a snappier news story, reporters seem to prefer explanations of aggression that invoke biological necessity, he says. An international conference of experts concluded in 1986 that war is not an inevitable part of human nature. When one member tried to convince reporters that this finding was newsworthy, few news organizations in the United States were interested. One reporter told him, "Call us back when you find a gene for war."

Leonard Eron, a psychologist at the University of Illinois in Chicago, observes, "TV teaches people that aggressive behavior is normative, that the world around you is a jungle when it is actually not so." In fact, research at the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School of Communications has shown that the more television an individual watches, the more likely he or she is to believe that "most people would take advantage of you if they got the chance."

The belief that violence in unavoidable, while disturbing at first glance, actually holds a curious attraction for some people. It also allows individuals to excuse their own acts of aggression by suggesting that they have little choice.

"In order to justify, accept, and live with war, we have created a psychology that makes it inevitable," says Dr. Bernard Lown, co-chairman of International Physicians for th4e Prevention of Nuclear War, which received the Nobel peace Prize in 1985. "It is a rationalization for accepting war as a system of resolving human conflict." To understand these explanations for the war-is-inevitable belief is to realize its consequences. Treating any behavior as inevitable sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy: By assuming we are bound to be aggressive, we are more likely to act that way and provide evidence for the assumption. People who believe that humans are naturally aggressive may also be unlikely to oppose particular wars.

The evidence suggests, then, that humans do have a choice with respect to aggression and war. To an extent, such destructiveness is due to the mistaken assumption that we are helpless to control an essentially violent nature."We live in a time," says Lown, "when accepting this as inevitable is no longer possible without courting extinction."

Impacts – Self-fulfilling Prophecy

Security has become an innate part of our countries identity. It has been proliferated beyond the area of national security to things like disease and the environment. This has created the make it impossible to find solutions for the problems that we attempt to secure.

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09)

We have inherited an ontology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference.

Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." 2

One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite.

There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the International Studies Quarterly, the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders. 3 After acknowledging that "the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable," the author proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat. 4 Recent attempts to broaden the concept of "security" to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening "to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems." 5 The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all.

The author of the essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems; 6 here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against "foreign" others, with the "postmodernist" as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on "political correctness," the "liberals" of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the specific (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves. 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " 8 By the end of the essay, one is lef

Impacts – Environmental Destruction

Militarism guarantees ecological destruction on unprecedented scales, culminating in extinction.

Cuomo 96 (Chris J., Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Cincinnati. Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4, Women and Violence, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Autumn 1996. JSTOR AD 7/9/09)

All told, including peacetime activities as well as the immense destruction caused by combat, military institutions probably present the most dramatic threat to ecological well-being on the planet. The military is the largest generator of hazardous waste in the United States, creating nearly a ton of toxic pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims that, "Global military activity may be the largest worldwide polluter and consumer of precious resources" (quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A conventionally powered aircraft carrier consumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day. In less than an hour's flight, a single jet launched from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a North American motorist bums in two years. One F-16 jet engine requires nearly four and a half tons of scarce titanium, nickel, chromium, cobalt, and energy-intensive aluminum (Thomas 1995, 5), and nine percent of all the iron and steel used by humans is consumed by the global military (Thomas 1995, 16). The United States Department of Defense generates 500,000 tons of toxins annually, more than the world's top five chemical companies combined. The military is the biggest single source of environmental pollution in the United States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1989, three-quarters went to military installations (Thomas 1995, 17). The feminization, commodification, and devaluation of nature helps create a reality in which its destruction in warfare is easily justified. In imagining an ethic that addresses these realities, feminists cannot neglect the extent to which military ecocide is connected, conceptually and practically, to transna- tional capitalism and other forms of human oppression and exploitation. Virtually all of the world's thirty-five nuclear bomb test sites, as well as most radioactive dumps and uranium mines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995, 6). Six multinationals control one-quarter of all United States defense con- tracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollars per minute is spent on the global military (Thomas 1995, 7). One could go on for volumes about the effects of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrial development and waste, and the disruption of wildlife, habitats, communities, and lifestyles that are inescapably linked to military practices. There are many conceptual and practical connections between military practices in which humans aim to kill and harm each other for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitary practices in which we displace, destroy, or seriously modify nonhuman communities, species, and ecosystems in the name of human interests. An early illustration of these connections was made by Rachel Carson in the first few pages of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as the inadvertent offspring of World War II chemical weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which insecticides were part of the Western-defined global corporatization of agriculture that helped kill off the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Military practices are no different from other human practices that damage and irreparably modify nature. They are often a result of cost-benefit analyses that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in terms of their use value for humans and they nearly always create unforeseeable effects for humans and nonhumans. In addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive than most other human activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they function as unquestioned "givens," they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach. It is worth noting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely unscrutinized by environmentalists, espe- cially American environmentalists, largely because fear allows us to be fooled into thinking that "national security" is an adequate excuse for "ecological military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16). If environmental destruction is a necessary aspect of war and the peacetime practices of military institutions, an analysis of war which includes its embeddedness in peacetime militarism is necessary to address the environmen- tal effects of war. Such a perspective must pay adequate attention to what is required to prepare for war in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of contemporary military institutions and practices.

Impacts – Biopower Bad

**Biopower wages war on entire populations and as conflict grows nuclear war becomes the only possible outcome.**

Foucault 78 (Michel, Professor of Philosophy at the College de France, The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, 136-137)

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of populatio

Impacts – Militarism Bad

Militarism can only lead to escalatory warfare that ultimately causes extinction.

Mészáros 3 (István, Hungarian Marxist philosopher, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex. He held the Chair of Philosophy at Sussex for fifteen years and was earlier Professor of Philosophy and Social Science for four years at York University. The Monthly Review, “Militarism and the Coming Wars” June 2003. http://monthlyreview.org/0603meszaros.htm AD 7/9/09)

Today the situation is qualitatively different for two principal reasons. First, the objective of the feasible war at the present phase of historical development, in accordance with the objective requirements of imperialism—world domination by capital’s most powerful state, in tune with its own political design of ruthless authoritarian “globalization” (dressed up as “free exchange” in a U.S. ruled global market)—is ultimately unwinnable, foreshadowing, instead, the destruction of humankind. This objective by no stretch of imagination could be considered a rational objective in accord with the stipulated rational requirement of the “continuation of politics by other means” conducted by one nation, or by one group of nations against another. Aggressively imposing the will of one powerful national state over all of the others, even if for cynical tactical reasons the advocated war is absurdly camouflaged as a “purely limited war” leading to other “open ended limited wars,” can therefore be qualified only as total irrationality. The second reason greatly reinforces the first. For the weapons already available for waging the war or wars of the twenty first century are capable of exterminating not only the adversary but the whole of humanity, for the first time ever in history. Nor should we have the illusion that the existing weaponry marks the very end of the road. Others, even more instantly lethal ones, might appear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Moreover, threatening the use of such weapons is by now considered an acceptable state strategic device. Thus, put reasons one and two together, and the conclusion is inescapable: envisaging war as the mechanism of global government in today’s world underlines that we find ourselves at the precipice of absolute irrationality from which there can be no return if we accept the ongoing course of development. What was missing from von Clausewitz’s classic definition of war as the “continuation of politics by other means” was the investigation of the deeper underlying causes of war and the possibility of their avoidance. The challenge to face up to such causes is more urgent today than ever before. For the war of the twenty first century looming ahead of us is not only “not winnable in principle.” Worse than that, it is in principle unwinnable. Consequently, envisaging the pursuit of war, as the Bush administration’s September 17, 2002 strategic document does, make Hitler’s irrationality look like the model of rationality.

Alt Solves – Reject

Rejecting the aff is the first step towards overcoming individual insecurities

Modern war is a result of individual insecurities; peace can only take root once we overcome those insecurities.

Iadicola and Shupe 3 (Peter and Anson, associate professor and chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology  at IPFW, *Violence, Inequality, and Human Freedom*, 2003, [AD](http://books.google.com/books?id=iPZglSEVOvMC&pg=PA377&lpg=PA377&dq=violence+inequality+and+human+freedom&source=bl&ots=jd3_9WHfeg&sig=KM8jBp0tlW2CljZDeaAH7Xu8HMI&hl=en&ei=Z15ZSq-HJYTEsQOswpieCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2AD): 7-11-9) KR

It is scientifically incorrect to say that war is caused by "instinct" or any single motivation. The emergence of modern warfare has been a journey from the primacy of emotional and motivational factors, sometimes called "instincts," to the primacy of cognitive factors. Modern war involves institutional use of personal characteristics such as obedience, suggestibility, and idealism; social skills such as language; and rational considerations such as cost-calculation, planning, and information processing. The technology of modem war has exaggerated traits associated with violence both in the training of actual combatants and in the preparation of support for war in the general population. As a result of this exaggeration, such traits are often mistaken to be the causes rather than the consequences of the process. We conclude that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake the transformative tasks needed in this International Year of Peace and in the years to come. Although these tasks are mainly institutional and collective, they also rest upon the consciousness of individual participants for whom pessimism and optimism are crucial factors. Just as "wars begin in the minds of men," peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us.

Rejecting security politics enables an analysis of militarism that solves the root causes of the aff

Cuomo 96 (Chris J., Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Cincinnati. Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4, Women and Violence, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Autumn 1996. JSTOR AD 7/28/09)

Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connec­tions among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

Alt Solves – Reject

The alt is a prerequisite to the aff – Local rejection is more useful than global political approaches life arms control

Futterman 94 (J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,” <http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html>, AD: 7/11/09)

The simile makes it clear that we need to work on international relationships. The relations between countries are often abusive affairs, in which power elites cynically use their own and other countries for short term gain. Lasting trust under such circumstances is unlikely. War is not. Just as peace cannot exist in a family in which members abuse one another, world peace cannot coexist with tyranny — of governments over people, or of governments over one another. Ultimately, we will choose one of Patrick Henry's alternatives. It will be liberty, or it will be death, whether we like it or not. It will also be power, or rather empowerment of the powerless. Of course, established power groups fear empowering someone else. As the saying goes, "One with a full house rarely asks for a new deal." Consider how we Americans are doing with economic empowerment of our embattled inner-city black communities. [[10]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html#10) When people die younger and are incarcerated more frequently than their neighbors, they are not at peace, nor can they let their neighbors be. Federal programs can help, but making peace will take personal involvement, neighbor to neighbor. And deterrence of those who would attack their neighbors. [[11]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html#11) Internationally, peace requires empowerment of some groups that seem eager to earn the hatred of the civilized world — like the Palestinians. Now that nuclear deterrence and economic necessity have combined to bring about more freedom, empowerment, and therefore peace in Europe, the Middle East is one of the next hot-spots for triggering a nuclear war. In order to have peace, the world must empower the Palestinians to determine their political and economic destiny, while at the same time it must deter them from warring with Israel. Such empowerment and deterrence will require the active involvement of the Islamic nations who thus far have been unwilling to empower the Palestinians to engage in much beyond stone-throwing and terrorism. May the Palestinians awaken to how they have been used by their brethren. So we need to make peace, at home and abroad. Before you demonstrate to make your town a nuclear-free zone or to stop nuclear testing, [[12]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html#12) consider what you can do to enlarge someone's freedom, or to help them obtain the power to determine a better life for themselves. In other words, rather than fight against nuclear weapons or even against war, try making peace. Meanwhile, I do what I can to make waging unlimited war dangerous, and preparation for it expensive. I can provide palliative treatment, but you, physicians/patients, must heal yourselves. Or to put it more bluntly, as long as we continue to express our human nature in disenfranchising, disempowering ways, we will cling to armament — nuclear or worse — to distance ourselves from our own nearness to war.

Critically engaging security is a necessary prerequisite for effective strategic policy

Booth et al. 5 (Ken and Andrew Linklater, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales-Aberystwyth, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* 2005.)

Almost all critical approaches argue that the prospects for reforming world politics and its constituent sovereign parts are much greater than realists allow. This is not to envisage a future world order in which commu­nicative action banishes strategic action entirely. Doubtless the two realms will continue to coexist in a state of tension, and progress toward a world in which strategic action plays a lesser role in world politics will continue to come up against the unyielding barriers of distrust between many commu­nities. The point, however, is not to regard a world order that revolves around strategic action as somehow embodying permanent truths about international politics or the human condition, but rather to regard such a world as the defacement and disfigurement of the human potential to enlarge the social realm that can be governed by dialogue and trust.9 When characterizing the current debate between critical security analysts and their opponents, it is useful to recall Immanuel Kant's efforts to preserve the strengths of realism in his ethical vision of a universal kingdom of ends and in his related comments about how this ideal can influence the world of policy and practice. Kant's belief that orientations toward communicative action are the prerequisites for radical global reform is central to debates surrounding critical theories of world politics in general and the more spe­cific domain of security studies.

Alt Solves – Reject

Analysis of the irrationality of security discourse allows us to break free from the discourse.

Anker 6 (Elisabeth, Assistant Professor of English at Wake Forest University, “The Only Thing We Have To Fear...,” Theory & Event, 8(3), AD: 7-9-9)

Robin argues that in order to disentangle the use of fear from the tight grasp of elite power, we need only to recognize the rational diagnosis of fear he puts forth: much like a Young Hegelian, Robin argues that as we see the truth of fear, we will be free from its repressive power. By identifying the pathways of fear in the social order, the liberal structure of governing institutions, and the workplace, liberal subjects will stop collaborating with fear, stop de-politicizing it, and move on to a more optimistic politics: one still liberal, but now based on hope, not fear. Politics could then be grounded in the liberating visions of Rawls, Dworkin and Habermas, not the darkened despair of Hobbes or Montesquieu (though it seems that Rawls, at least, enjoins a political order generated by the fear of living at the bottom of society.) Yet these hopeful visions that Robin celebrates are mentioned only in passing, as if their promises of liberation were so patent as to pass without scrutiny. While Robin rightly takes communitarians to task for postulating a model of individuality too weak and fearful to support itself without the backbone of a strong social order, Robin takes just the opposite position: he supplies a paradigm of selfhood so agentic and autonomous that with minimal promptings it can create its own conditions of existence. Acknowledging the constraints of political fear is sufficient for Robin's individual to break its shackles and reorient itself toward a politics grounded in hope.

**Questioning security solves**

Dillon 96 (Michael, “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, http://www.questia.com/read/103092657?title=Politics%20of%20Security:%20Towards%20a%20Political%20Philosophy%20of%20Continental%20Thought#, AD: 7/10/9) A

But because the project is ne concerned with what is required in order to recover the question of the political, by asking must we secure security I refrain from any engagement with the enormous and secondary literature surrounding security- Particularly the exposition of such literature in the past fifteen years because none of it can help me with this project, on the contrary, that literature proves a fundamental obstacle because it does not ask the question of security as such.It invokes security as a ground and seeks largely to specify what security is; how security might be attained; and which are the most basic, effective, or cost-effective means of doing so. Along the way, it occasionally notes a so-called security paradox; that my security project may excite your insecurity. What it does not do is relies that there is never security without insecurity and that the one always occurs in whatever form with the other. Indeed, of course, our politics of security does not ask after its own ground in terms of the question of the political either. We have, instead, to make security questionable, and go through that questioning process, in order to arrive at the threshold of the question of the political itself. Once we recognize that we have to think security and insecurity together, we have already moved beyond security thinking towards posing the thought of the obligatory freedom of human being itself. In short, it is only at that point that we find ourselves on the path of beginning to think the aporia of obligatory human freedom as it manifests itself in our times, and have

Alt Solves – Reject

**Distancing ourselves from security is critical to engaging life and being political**

Dillon 96 (Michael, “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, http://www.questia.com/read/103092657?title=Politics%20of%20Security:%20Towards%20a%20Political%20Philosophy%20of%20Continental%20Thought#, AD: 7/9/9)

There is, then, an exquisite paradox at work here. Our (inter)national politics of security hide what they most depend upon, by making it most obvious. The metaphysical dynamics and demands that determine them are securely secured—locked away and forgotten—by means of the very insistence upon security itself. The engagement with security has not, therefore, even begun. Securing security is, it seems, too immediate and too pervasive a preoccupation within our world. We have not, yet, been sufficiently separated from it. Locked in an intensely technologised epistemic preoccupation with it, we lack the dramatic distance needed for re-thinking the belonging together of security and insecurity and so, therefore, of a politics which operates in an understanding of their indissoluble, and indissolubly agonistic, connection in the condition of obligatory freedom.

Alt Solves – Discourse

Representations are not neutral—they convey their status as “threat” to security

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), p. 526-527, AD: 7-28-9)

First, as Ronald Deibert insightfully illustrated, to understand the importance of this shift in communicative action it is necessary to understand it as a shift of medium.40 Different mediums (speech, print, and electronic, or—as Deibert terms it—“hypermedia’’) are not neutral in their communicative impact. The conditions of the production and reception of communicative acts are influenced fundamentally by the medium through which they are transmitted. In the aftermath of the extraordinary images of September 11, this point is obvious to the point of banality, but it raises complex questions of explanation. How, for example, is it possible to assess the events following September 11 without an appraisal of the impact that the extraordinary (and repeated) images of that event had on reactions to it? Similarly, how has the role of images—particularly the desire to avoid images of mass destruction and civilian casualties, and the representation of the goals of the military campaign—been involved in structuring understandings of the ‘‘appropriate’’ response? Analogously, in an area of long-standing concern to the Copenhagen School, the rise of migration on the ‘‘security’’ agenda in Europe must be viewed in the context of how migration is ‘‘experienced’’ by relevant publics. This experience is inevitably constructed in part by the images (and discussions based around them) of televisual media: nightly images of shadowy figures attempting to jump on trains through the Channel Tunnel between France and the UK, for example, or of lines of ‘‘asylum seekers’’ waiting to be picked up for a day’s illicit labor (both common on UK television), have—whatever the voiceover—an impact that must be assessed in their own terms, constituting as they do a key element of the experience of many people on the issue of immigration and its status as a ‘‘threat.’’ Clearly, the issues involved here are beyond the scope of this treatment. But it seems clear that any theory that is premised on the social impact of communicative action must assess the impact that different mediums of communication have on the acts, their impacts, and their influence on the processes of securitization.

Examining the ways in which communications shape audiences is key

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), p. 527, AD: 7-28-9)

This shift in communicative structures—In the medium of communication at the center of visual media—represents a key challenge for securitization theory. Most straightforwardly, this would entail a focus on how speech-acts are framed within visual imagery. As the linguistic and the image are reconfigured within performative action in an age of electronic media, a broader understanding of the rhetorics of securitization is required.41 More complexly, it also requires an examination of the ways in which images themselves may function as communicative acts, an analysis of how meaning is conveyed by images, as well as an assessment of how images interact with more familiar forms of verbal rhetoric. Finally, it also calls for a focus on how televisual communications—often broadcast and received well beyond the political borders and cultural boundaries of their production42—Impact on different audiences, and the securitizing consequences that may follow from this fact.

A2: Perm

Fear reduces the prospects for political change – The perm can’t solve

Anker 6 (Elisabeth, Assistant Professor of English at Wake Forest University, “The Only Thing We Have To Fear...,” Theory & Event, 8(3), AD: 7-9-9)

It is either luck or foresight when an author publishes a book this timely; in Corey Robin's case, it is clearly foresight. In a daily life brimming with color-coded terrorist threats, commercials depicting salivating wolves prowling for ripe American flesh, and panicky justifications of national security for eroding civil liberties, an intellectual analysis on the politics of fear could not have come at a better time. In fact, part of what is most valuable about Fear: The History of a Political Idea is that much of it was written before the events of September 11; Fear disputes the idea that American political life has been transformed since 9/11 by showing that the mobilization of fear for political purposes is an enduring (and even antediluvian) tactic for harnessing power and marshalling a collectivity. Political fear, according to Robin, is fear that arises from conflicts within or between societies, and can be divided into two types: a people's felt apprehension of a harm to their collective well-being or the intimidation wielded over men and women by governments or groups.(2) Robin conceptualizes fear as a political problem; it is a force that tames political life, not merely subduing political subjects but altering their guiding principles under the weight of its intense coercion.

Perm fails, only the alt’s move away from traditional modes of thinking will solve.

Futterman 94 (J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,” [**http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html**](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html), AD: 7/11/09)

As we float in a mood of post-millennial angst, the future appears to be out of favor. Mere mention of the idea of farsightedness – of trying to analyze what may occur in our wake in order to better understand how to live in the here and now – conjures up images of fortune-telling crystal balls and doomsday prophets, or of eccentric pundits equipped with data-crunching supercomputers spewing forth fanciful prognostications. The future, then, has seemingly become the province of mystics and scientists, a realm into which the rest of us rarely venture. This curious situation goes back to a founding paradox of early modernity, which sought to replace pagan divination and Judeo-Christian eschatology with its own rational system of apprehending time. Thus came into being the philosophy of history, according to which human destiny unfolds teleologically by following a knowable and meaningful set of chronological laws leading to a final state of perfection; Condorcet, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to name but a few, are the children of this kind of historicism that expresses an unwavering faith in the Enlightenment’s credo of inherent progress over time. Yet in our post-metaphysical age, where the idea of discovering universal and stable temporal laws has become untenable, the philosophy of history lies in ruins. What has stepped into the breach is a variety of sciences of governance of the future, ranging from social futurism to risk management. By developing sophisticated modeling techniques, prognosticators aim to convert the future into a series of predictable outcomes extrapolated from present-day trends, or a set of possibilities to be assessed and managed according to their comparative degrees of risk and reward.1 Although commendable in their advocacy of farsightedness, these scientistic forms of knowledge are hampered by the fact that their longing for surefire predictive models have inevitably come up short. If historicism and scientistic governance offer rather unappealing paradigms for contemplating the future, a turn to the conventional political forecasts of the post-Cold War world order hardly offers more succor. Entering the fray, one is rapidly submerged by Fukuyama’s “end of history,” Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” Kaplan’s “coming anarchy,” or perhaps most distressing of all, the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of unilateral pre-emption. For the Left, this array of unpalatable scenarios merely prolongs the sense of hope betrayed and utopias crushed that followed the collapse of the socialist experiment. Under such circumstances, is it any wonder that many progressive thinkers dread an unwelcomed future, preferring to avert their gazes from it while eyeing foresight with equal doses of suspicion and contempt? But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian ‘Not-Yet’ remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring

A2: Perm

Political reform coopts the alternative – Only individual discursive changes solve

Anker 6 (Elisabeth, Assistant Professor of English at Wake Forest University, “The Only Thing We Have To Fear...,” Theory & Event, 8(3), AD: 7-9-9)

Robin persuasively argues that liberalism cannot escape its own paradoxical inheritance as both opposed to and grounded in fear; but if fear is constitutive for liberalism, how can one uphold liberalism while jettisoning fear as a seedbed for political life? Taking Robin's argument to its logical conclusion, liberalism is by its very nature incapable of abandoning the fear that is its foundation and subsistence. Liberalism is not merely an ideological orientation but one tethered to specific institutions, histories, and modes of operation generated and bound by the politics of fear. Whereas Robin asks us to acknowledge these specificities, he then argues for a liberalism untethered to any particularity, for a liberalism realized only in theory. The path of Robin's argument is more revolutionary than he is willing to acknowledge; it would require a transformation of liberalism into a more radical democratic politics, in which widespread

State-centricity coopts the perm – The political focus of the aff makes sovereign identity, our link to otherization inevitable

Campbell 98 (David, Professor of International politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg 38-39)

The subfield of international relations that serves as the main body of literature on foreign is that of “comparative foreign policy,” a field indebted to the realist orthodoxy that underpins the discipline’s view of the cold war.4 A number of reviews have provided a clear insight to the entailments and assumptions of this dominant mode of understanding foreign policy. In the introduction to a collection that surveyed “new directions” in the study of foreign policy, James Rosenau noted with approval that the conspicuous absence of “ philosophical and methodological argumentation” in the collected essays was an indication of the field’s passage into a “more mature era of inquiry.” In contrast to earlier periods “the epistemological and methodological premises on which the analysis rest[s]…are largely taken for granted.”5 These assumptions give rise to a conventional and largely unquestioned substantive focus (for scholars rather than practitioners) in foreign policy analysis: the policies of states oriented toward the external world.6 Rosenau has provided an illuminating metaphor to describe this focus. Foreign policy analysis, he argued, “is a bridging discipline. It takes as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called states to build to link themselves and their subsystems to the even more encompassing international systems of which they are a part.”7 In this understanding, global politics comprises states, their(domestic) subsystems, and international systems. These systems and subsystems exist independently of, and prior to, any relationship that results from their joining by the “bridge” of foreign policy. That bridge is consciously constructed by the state in an effort to make itself part of the larger system and to deal with the dangers and uncertainties that the larger system holds for its own security. As a phenomenon thought to be common to all states, we speak about foreign policy of state “x” or state “y,” Thereby indicating that the state is prior to the policy. Underpinned by a commitment to epistemic realism, this understanding depends on the “explicit and grounded... prior conceptualizations of variables and relationships.”8 These variables are the internal factors of the state and the external conditions of the international system.

The discourse of the 1AC already assumed that security was desirable- the perm cannot sever that

Luke 95 [Timothy W. Prof. of Poli Sci Virginia Tech, “On Environmentality: Geopower and EcoKnowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism, Cultural Critique, No. 31 Fall JSTOR AD 07/11/09]

Governmental discourses methodically mobilize particular assumptions, codes, and procedures in enforcing specific understandings about the economy and society. As a result, they generate "truths" or "knowledges" that also constitute forms of power with significant reserves of legitimacy and effectiveness. Inasmuch as they classify, organize, and vet larger understandings of reality, such discourses can authorize or invalidate the possibilities for constructing particular institutions, practices, or concepts in society at large. They simultaneously frame the emergence of collective subjectivities (nations as dynamic populations) and collections of subjects (individuals) as units in such nations. Individual subjects as well as collective subjects can be reevaluated as "the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power" (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 29). Therefore, an environmentalizing regime must advance eco-knowledges to activate its command over geo-power as well as to re-operationalize many of its notions of governmentality as environmentality. Like governmentality, the disciplinary articulations of environmentality must center upon establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things."

A2: Perm

The perm’s attempt to combine theory with realism fails at realizing either.

Bartleson 0 (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Stockholm, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 47-8)

The synthesis advocated by structurationists and scientific realists not only holds out the hope of resolving conceptual conflicts within existing fields of knowledge. It also makes the breaching of disci­plinary boundaries look virtuous, since it promises to settle the ontolo­gical differences underlying their compartmentalization into distinct fields. What makes this promise look attractive is the quite naive assumption that the way a problem in political philosophy is formula­ted is independent of the way in which solutions to it are presented. The general incommensurability between agency and structure, first ele­vated into a problem of imperial proportions by structurationists, is then opened to a glorious peace-by-interdependence between con­flicting concepts and estranged fields of knowledge. From a decon­structive viewpoint, however, it is the 'undisputed truth' underlying the 'agent-structure problem' that is the real problem, since it is the former which makes the latter look like a chicken-and-egg debate. To say that all social and political life is ultimately composed of two kinds of stuff is simply to presuppose that essence is essential to social and political theory. Ontological questions invariably yield ontological answers, since they drag the political philosopher into a quest for firm foundations and proper origins. Starting with the assumption that agency and structure are radically different in essence, which it is necessary to do in order to depict all prior theoretical efforts to wrestle with this conceptual zero-sum game as vain, the structurationist then solves his problem by pointing to the fact that what is different always shares one thing in common, namely, the fact of being different.

At this point, the 'agent-structure' debate seems to deconstruct itself; being centred on the quest for essence, it pushes us back in an infinite series of reversals. Whenever a structure is identified, its existence is conditioned by a prior agency, which in turn is made possible by yet another structure, and so forth. However far back we push in this series in search of a foundation, what appears as essential will always prove to be supplementary, in a way that deprives it of the authority of ontological simplicity. The attempted synthesis tries to overcome the same ontological difference that nourishes it: if the problem could be solved, the solution must also indicate that there was no problem in the first place.

The reconceptualization of sovereignty that comes with the structu­rationist effort to relate the domestic inside and the international outside can be regarded as symptomatic of the quest for essence that governs it. The very problem that the conceptualization of sovereignty in relational terms hopes to solve, merely crops up again at a more certain depth, but now beyond the reach of critical concepts. To say that sovereignty is constitutive with respect to both the domestic and the international by being that which makes the internal internal and the external external, is either to turn sovereignty into an agency that structures or a structure that acts; in both cases the original problem is restored.

The perm relies upon the same conservative thought which caused these problems in the first place

Dillon 96(Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security)*

Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance to it - especially in International Relations - nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a political conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of thought. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Remaining politics therefore means thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently leads to thinking 'difference' itself.

Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, as much as it does from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialization and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms. The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so- called suspicion of thought - I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought - is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity: that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject. Motivated therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is, therefore, to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, by departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised. This is a tall order, and not least because the political philosophy of continental thought cannot be brought to bear upon International Relations if the political thought of that thought remains largely unthought.

Discourse First

Security discourse shapes reality – Threats are only threats insofar as we perceive them as threats

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/10/09)

"Intersubjectivity" among the actors in international relations includes not only the mutually constituted relationship between two actors--in terms of the logic  of the state system, between potentially hostile states--but also interpretations of position  and responses to interpretations  that arise from the logic of that relationship. In other words, the structure of the system as it is commonly understood provides the setting within which interpretations take place. So far, this is not very different from the neorealist notion that anarchy and self-help require the state to ensure its own security. What the condition of intersubjectivity adds to this is the idea that there is nothing "objective" about this arrangement; it grows out of the mutual interpretations and responses to one another by the actors constituting the system.

The logic, the interpretation and the response together comprise the "speech act" of security. As Ole Wæver has put it,

With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act . In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more "real"; it is the utterance itself  that is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. [2](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note2)

Security discourse makes war inevitable – we are forced into a system where uncertainty demands violent action

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/10/09)

For the state policymaker, the "security dilemma" thus has taken on a new meaning. Confronted by limited resources and forced to make choices, the fragmentation of states and the loss of certainty will make it that much more difficult to decide who or what constitutes a problem of security. Threats can always be constructed through the speech acts of security, but they do not always perform as expected nor are they always believed by those who are to be secured. Sometimes, they just go away, leaving behind them a security "vacuum" of a sort different than that posited by geopolitics and realists. As Constantine Cavafy put it,

**A2: Vague Alt (Space Specific)**

**We must resist security, even in small ways. Imaging alternatives is imperative, because the AFF will inevitably create “terrifying structures of domination”**

Duvall & Havercroft 2006 (Raymond, & Jonathan Prof poli sci at Minnesota & Prof of poli sci at U. of British Colombia) “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World”, October, <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/Havercroft_paper.pdf>

Given these grim prospects for a deterritorialised global rule,69 what are the possibilities for resistance? Historically, every advance in the weaponry of imperial powers has been met with an advance in counter-hegemonic strategy. Most recently, insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to counter the technological superiority of US forces with very simple yet effective Improvised Explosive Devices. In these instances, those subjugated by the technologies and scientific knowledge linked to emerging weapons systems have reappropriated these weapons systems to resist their imperial overlords. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that space weaponry could be countered through a variety of asymmetrical tactics such as: disabling space weapons while in orbit through kinetic energy, or even nuclear anti-satellite attacks; destroying the facilities where space weapons are produced or launched, or the research and development centres (such as universities) that are integral to the production of these systems; organising strikes for the workers involved in harvesting the necessary raw materials; and refusing to pay taxes to the political apparatuses that control these systems. While it is difficult to imagine what precise forms resistance to space weapons might take, it is not unreasonable to conclude that even in a context of space-based empire, some form of political and military resistance will be possible, and will occur. Indeed, China’s recent launch of an Anti-Satellite system is an example of a state actor at the boundaries of imperial order engaging in such a reappropriation of a weapons technology. One of the reasons Chinese military strategists have given for developing Anti-Satellite technology is that this technology exposes an asymmetrical vulnerability in the US military structure. The US military is already dependent on satellite systems to co-ordinate its communications and weapons targeting systems. By developing a technology that can disable US communications and targeting satellites, the Chinese military would hope to disrupt the operational abilities of conventional US forces should an actual shooting war between the two powers take place.70 The development gives us some idea of how state and non-state actors at the margins of an empire of the future might resist space power by reappropriating its technologies. Sovereignty as strategy Yet, even as China’s ASAT test points to one possible way of resisting the empire of the future it also points to one way in which this empire is currently being constituted. Within US strategic planning circles China’s ASAT test has been used as an impetus to increase funding to American space weapons research and development initiatives. This reaction by the US defence policy establishment is indicative of the strategic logic at work in the empire of the future. This strategic logic accelerates processes of deterritorialisation by pursuing the development of technologies that make the control of territory irrelevant; yet the logic simultaneously pursues the reterritorialisation of the US and orbital space as areas that should be off-limits to non-American actors. We are explicitly drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation here.71 In their writings deterritorialisation refers to ‘the movement by which ‘‘one’’ leaves the territory’. Reterritorialisation is the process that accompanies deterritorialisation, whereby the sovereign state apparatus recombines the deterritorialised elements to constitute a new assemblage. This is precisely the logic of the singular control by the US of weapons in Earth’s orbital space. The strategy of the empire of the future undermines the binary logic of a states-system predicated either on territorially bounded sovereign states or a globally diffused, decentralised and deterritorialised biopolitical Empire as proposed by Hardt and Negri. Our analysis reveals a third possibility: in the empire of the future space power combines a set of otherwise heterogeneous processes. Space based missiledefence strips all states – except the possessor of the system – of their hard shells by eroding nuclear deterrence capabilities, while providing the possessor of missile defence with a territory more secure from nuclear attack. Space control denies all states with the exception of the controlling power unfettered access to space. Furthermore it annexes orbital space as a territory of the space power. Finally, force application from orbital space makes any point on earth a potential target for the military force of empire of the future. This makes the traditional imperial imperative to project force through controlling territory no longer necessary. Empire of the future combines strategies of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation to simultaneously undermine some features of state sovereignty and reinforce others. Therefore the current assumption that many IR theorists make that international society must be based on either a collection of sovereign territorial states or deterritorialised biopolitical apparatuses ignores the possibility that these two processes can be co-constitutive. In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire’s new modes of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything humanity has yet encountered.

A2: Framework (Space Specific)

The narrative of space exploration is inherently tied to the ideology of security. The Aff takes this as a given, and we should be able to question it.

Mellor 2007, felicity,Prof @– Imperial College (London), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space.” Social Studies of Science Vol. 37, No. 4 (Aug., 2007), pp. 499-531

McCurdy highlights the alignment between the promotion of the impact threat and works of fiction. In this paper, I consider the reconceptualization of asteroid science that this alignment entailed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a complete history of the science of planetary impacts. My focus is on how a group of scientists moved from seeing impacts as significant events in Earth history to seeing them as threatening events in the human future – a move from historical to futurological narratives. Nor is there space to give a full account of the empirical developments that were used to support the construal of asteroids as a threat. Rather, I wish to make the case that these empirical developments were given meaning within a specific narrative context which drew civilian astronomers into contact with defence scientists, especially those working on SDI. A number of studies (for example, McDougall, 1985; Forman, 1987; Kevles, 1990; DeVorkin, 1992; Leslie, 1993; Dennis, 1994) have revealed the ways in which US research programmes and nominally-civilian scientific institutions originated in military programmes.1 One aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the boundary between civilian and military science is blurred not just institutionally, but also at a fundamental conceptual level. The civilian scientists discussed here followed different working practices and traded in different forms of expertise than did the defence scientists. They were typically astronomers or planetary scientists who worked for NASA or on NASA-funded research programmes at universities and private institutes. They saw themselves as distinct from the defence scientists who were typically physicists and engineers working on new weapons systems or other technologies of national security at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or at armed services institutions. 2 Yet the two groups came to share an interest in asteroids and with that a set of assumptions about the nature of human society, the role of technology and our place in outer space. As they came into contact, their differing backgrounds meant they disagreed over a number of issues, yet both sides pursued the collaboration despite the tensions. Many studies of the interaction between military and civilian science have focused on sources of funding and shared technologies.3 Important as these are, they fail to capture fully the dynamic between the two communities. In particular, a cynical picture of scientists simply pursuing sources of funding on any terms cannot reveal the far-reaching ways in which civilian research can become entrenched in particular patterns of thinking which are supportive of militaristic programmes. For military/civilian collaborations to be sustained, civilian scientists need to share with their counterparts in the defence sector an understanding of the overall trajectory of their research. For shared technologies to be developed, they need first to be imagined. Military/civilian interactions are therefore predicated on, and mediated through, a shared technoscientific imaginary. Despite expressing concerns about the motives and methods of the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists who promoted the asteroid impact threat drew on narratives that configured a human role in space in a similar way to SDI. These narratives helped make asteroids conceivable as a threat, yet they also served to make acceptable, and even necessary, the idea of space-based weaponry. Despite their disagreements, at the level of their shared narratives the discourses of the civilian and defence scientists were mutually supportive. Several studies of the role of narrative in the production of scientific knowledge have identified it as a means of generating coherence in science that both enables and constrains further research (Haraway, 1989; O’Hara, 1992; Rouse, 1996; Brown, 1998). Richard Harvey Brown is the most explicit about what constitutes a narrative, defining it as ‘an accounting of events or actions temporally that explains them causally or motivationally’ (Brown, 1998: 98). Brown’s definition of narrative fits with that of narrative theorists such as Mieke Bal (1997) who have stressed that narrative entails not a random unfolding of events but a sequenced ordering involving a transition from one state to another brought about or experienced by actors. One implication of this is the fundamental role of causality and agency. Another is that a narrative beginning always anticipates an ending – a resolution or closure to the events that have been set in motion. Historian Hayden White (1981: 23) has argued that the tendency to present history as narrative ‘arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image or life that is and can only be imaginary’. He finds that narrative closure involves a passage from one moral order to another. ‘Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’ (White, 1981: 22). In this sense, narrative is inherently teleological and ideological. The inexorable movement of a narrative towards a predetermined end ensures that its many assumptions go unchallenged. An analytical approach to the interaction between military and civilian science that recognizes the ideological function of narrative can help sidestep some of the difficulties associated with the distortionist thesis often attributed to Paul Forman’s (1987) landmark paper on the military basis of US post-war physics. Forman has been criticized for implying that without military patronage, physics would have followed an ideal direction unaffected by outside interests (for example, Kevles, 1990). By looking at what sorts of narratives scientists draw on, we can avoid Forman’s supposed idealism. The question is not so much whether science has been distorted, but through which of many possible stories a research programme has been articulated. To ask which stories have been invoked is to ask which ideologies have implicitly been accepted. And to ask that is to allow that, on ideological grounds, some stories are preferable to others. Because narratives are shared within a research community, they are not always explicitly articulated in texts. Technical papers are most likely to hide the fundamental assumptions that underpin a research area. However, literature addressed to wider audiences is often more explicit. Grey literature, such as policy reports or review papers, and popularizations written by scientists are therefore useful sources for identifying the narrative context in which a science is framed, traces of which may also be found in technical papers. While always remembering that such accounts are written with particular persuasive or marketing goals in mind, these texts nonetheless reveal what, to the scientist-author, is both thinkable and compelling. In what follows, I draw on this full range of texts, from technical papers to popularizations, to show that the scientists promoting the impact threat have repeatedly turned to narratives of technological salvation that imagined the ultimate superweapon – a space-based planetary defence system that would protect the Earth from the cosmic enemy. I begin with a brief overview of earlier conceptions of asteroids before outlining the events through which asteroids were promoted as a threat and examining the narrative context in which this occurred. I finish by arguing that the narration of the impact threat entailed a reconceptualization of asteroids, space and astronomy and invoked a ‘narrative imperative’ that helped legitimize the militarization of space.

**S**pace representations create space policy- we should be able to critique that

Grondin 2009 (David, Prof of Political Studies—University of Ottawa)

“The (Power) Politics of Space: The U.S. Astropolitical Discourse of Global Dominance in the War on Terror” Outer Space. London: Routledge, 2009

Space was seen as a sanctuary during the Cold War. But because of the context of the War on Terror, the US now seems to be ready to go against the second Article of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that stipulates that “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”, the treaty which set out the principle that Space is to be used for “the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind” (Article 1). In effect, since 2001, the US wished to be the one responsible for setting new rules in Outer Space and for creating the conditions of its military dominance of Space. For instance, the merger of the US Space Command with the Strategic Command in January 2004 stems from this logic that wishes Space operations to be integrated in all domains of US military power. Because the US still possesses control over much of the information gathering in Space, it is interested in securitizing and Americanizing the “last frontier”, especially in the context of the War on Terror. As it stands, the US neoliberal geopolitics discourse of the Bush Administration on Space power still leads to Space weaponization. US sovereignty is placed as higher than any other forms of rule and the US prepares itself militarily, just in case Outer Space would turn into a battlefield. In Donald Rumsfeld’s words: “Our goal is not to bring war into space, but rather to defend against those who would” (Rumsfeld, quoted in Waldrop 2005 [2002]: 39). This participates in the discourse of a global security state that sees Outer Space as the most “global” of space. “Insofar as the weaponization of space represents the ‘cutting edge’ and highest ambitions of military primacy, it also represents the height of this folly” (Huntley 2005: 83). If we consider that political rhetoric creates political reality that may serve as bases for decisions, it appears fundamental to assess how the US wishes to securitize Outer Space with its will to achieve full-spectrum dominance in all battlespaces, as stated in the 2004 and 1997 National Military Strategies. Deeply anchored in the War on Terror cartography, where 9/11 serves as the ultimate justification since “one must prepare militarily for the worst since the worst has happened” (or so it goes), the US places itself in a state of insecurity by saying that even if no one may inflict them casualty in Space, nothing can guarantee that it will not happen in the future. This is why they prefer to try this likelihood and securitize Outer Space as part of the homeland security strategy. The paradox of the securitization and Americanization of Outer Space is that it could lead to its very opposite by allowing space weaponization to still be possible, if not inevitable.

**A2: Science is true/objective (Space Specific)**

Scientists actively participate in securitization- the 1AC presentation of threats is a link

Mellor 10, Prof @Imperial College London, “Negotiating uncertainty: asteroids, risk and the media”, Public Understand. Sci. 19(1) (2010) 16–33

Over the past two decades, British newspapers have periodically announced the end of the world. Playful headlines such as “The End is Nigh” and “Armageddon Outta Here!” are followed a few days later by reports that there’s no danger after all: “PHEW. The end of the world has been cancelled” (Britten, 1998; Wickham, 2002; Evening Standard, 1998). These stories, and others like them appearing in news media around the world, deal with the possibility that an asteroid or comet may one day collide with the Earth causing global destruction. The threat posed by near-Earth objects (NEOs) has been actively promoted by a group of astronomers and planetary scientists since the late 1980s. Construing asteroids and comets as risky objects, the NEO scientists have lobbied politicians and written popular books calling for dedicated sky surveys to identify potentially hazardous asteroids. Yet despite their own efforts to draw the public’s attention to the issue, the scientists have worried about the way in which the impact threat is reported in the news media, especially in the UK. After each episode of media coverage, they have attempted to find new ways of controlling the representation of asteroids as a risk. At the heart of their concerns has been the question of how they can manage uncertain knowledge about asteroids whilst retaining their authority as scientists. This paper examines the tensions which arise when natural scientists position themselves in the public arena as experts on risk by looking at the ways in which the NEO scientists have constructed asteroids as a risk, their struggles to control the media representation of the issue, and the assumptions on which their evolving communication strategy has been based. Since it was reports in the UK press which most concerned the scientists, it is on these that this paper focuses. Social theorist Ulrich Beck (2000: xii) has used comet impacts to illustrate how modern society has moved away from a preoccupation with natural risks: “We are no longer talking about comets crashing to earth or accidents with a greater or lesser degree of probability occurring.” In his Risk Society, Beck (1992) argues that our current phase of modernization is defined by the replacement of localized, natural hazards with global, technological risks. Yet the demarcation between natural and technological risks is not as clear-cut as Beck seems to imply. Debates about the probabilities of “natural” risks are as characteristic of the risk society as are controversies about industrial risks. As this paper shows, even astronomers— the scientists whose objects of study are furthest removed from the products of industrialization— can be active participants in the discourses of risk. We are still talking about comets (and asteroids) crashing to Earth, but we are doing so in a new way. “Natural” risks such as the impact threat are, like industrial risks, constructed through scientific discourses made available through technological developments. The impact threat has all the characteristics of one of Beck’s “risks of modernization”: it is global, unlimited in time, and invisible until made visible by science. Sociologists of science have examined the ways in which scientists construct and manage risk. Scholars such as Brian Wynne argue that risk is context dependent and that scientific risk assessments constrain discourse by rendering risk the object of quantitative analyses and by imposing a strict demarcation of risk from ethics and political values (e.g., Wynne, 2001). The issue of risk is closely related to how uncertainties within scientific knowledge are negotiated. Constructivist analyses of scientific uncertainty argue that uncertainty is not simply an absence of knowledge or an aspect of underlying reality, but something which is actively constructed and managed (Pinch, 1981; Campbell, 1985; Star, 1985; Stocking and Holstein, 1993; Zehr, 1999). Holly Stocking (1998: 168), for instance, using the term “ignorance” to cover uncertainties, errors, absences of knowledge and other forms of non-knowing, argues that ignorance, like knowledge, is “a construction embedded in diverse social interests and commitments.” The authority of science emerges as a key issue shaped by uncertainty claims. Although uncertainty can potentially undermine scientific authority in public science settings, it is often used to enhance it (Campbell, 1985; Zehr, 1999). In a study of scientific policy advisors, Shackley andWynne (1996) find that scientists manage uncertainties flexibly to facilitate their interactions with policymakers at the same time as maintaining their authority. Uncertainty can also serve to demarcate science and the public. In a study of policy advice on the risk from mobile phones, Stilgoe (2007) finds that uncertainty and public concerns are co-produced— the judgment about what forms of uncertainty are appropriate also entails a judgment about which, if any, public concerns are relevant. In the news media, too, uncertainty can offer a means through which scientific authority can be negotiated. Zehr (2000) finds that uncertainty, constructed through news values such as controversy and novelty, provided a frame for newspaper coverage of global warming. The way in which uncertainty was managed served to position scientists as the providers of authoritative knowledge and the public as misinformed. However, journalists and scientists may construct uncertainty in conflicting ways. Stocking (1999) argues that scientists often make ignorance claims to support particular actions but that such claims can be appropriated and modified by the news media to serve their, typically different, interests. This modification of uncertainty claims often leads scientists to complain that the media coverage of risk is sensationalist and aberrant (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992). As this paper shows, even when journalists uncritically reproduce scientists’ own uncertainty claims, scientists can construe news reports as undermining their credibility and can respond by seeking further control over public discourse.

**A2: Science is true/objective (Space Specific)**

**Claims of neutrality ARE a link-science is part of the narrative of security, denying it only furthers sovereign control.**

MacDonald 2007 (Fraser, prof of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies @

University of Melbourne ) “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography” *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5) (2007) pp. 592–615

In this discussion so far, I have been drawing attention to geography’s recent failure to engage outer space as sphere of inquiry and it is important to clarify that this indictment applies more to human than to physical geography. There are, of course, many biophysical currents of geography that directly draw on satellite technologies for remote sensing. The ability to view the Earth from space, particularly through the Landsat programme, was a singular step forward in understanding all manner of Earth surface processes and biogeographical patterns

(see Mack, 1990). The fact that this new tranche of data came largely from military platforms (often under the guise of ‘dual use’) was rarely considered an obstacle to science. But, as the range of geographical applications of satellite imagery have increased to include such diverse activities as urban planning and ice cap measurements, so too has a certain reflexivity about the provenance of the images. It is not enough, some are realizing, to say ‘I just observe and explain desertification and I have nothing to do with the military’; rather, scientists need to acknowledge the overall context that gives them access to this data in the fi rst place (Cervino *et al*., 2003: 236). One thinks here of the case of Peru, whose US grant funding for agricultural use of Landsat data increased dramatically in the 1980s when the same images were found to be useful in locating insurgent activities of Maoist ‘Shining Path’ guerrillas (Schwartz, 1996). More recently, NASA’s civilian Sea- Wide Field Studies (Sea-WiFS) programme was used to identify Taliban forces during the war in Afghanistan (Caracciolo, 2004). The practice of geography, in these cases as with so many others, is bound up with military logics (Smith, 1992); the development of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) being a much-cited recent example (Pickles, 1995; 2004; Cloud, 2001; 2002; see Beck, 2003, for a case study of GIS in the service of the ‘war on terror’).

**Scientists are not concerned with ethical outcomes**

Burkhardt 99 (Jeffery Professor of Ethics and Agricultural Economics in the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences of the University of Florida) Scientific Values and Moral Education in the Teaching of Science, Perspectives on Science 7.1 (1999) 87-110

The problem is that implicit scientific commitment to the PITs prevents scientists, and others as well, from deliberately engaging in the process of attaining moral knowledge. But in not doing so deliberately, they do so covertly. Indeed, the positivist commitment in science has led to the educational practice in the sciences of systematically ignoring other dimensions of science and other kinds of knowledge beyond positivistically-defined scientific knowledge. Rarely are matters pertaining to the moral role of scientific experts addressed, particularly with respect to the reality- and knowledge-defining function of the sciences in our secularized society. Rarely are questions of larger social responsibilities fathomed in a systematic way. When they are, it is usually, referring to Winner's (1986) wonderful image, at "the last resort," over "brandy and cigars." Even the values or responsibilities one learns though Implicit Scientific Values Education are generally not systematically or explicitly discussed. At best, in failing to raise moral questions, communicate moral beliefs, allow discussion of moral claims, facilitate concern for moral matters, or simply acknowledge [End Page 104] that a moral dimension exists in scientific activity, the message is conveyed that such matters are irrelevant and unimportant. Or, the message may be that those concerns are somebody else's business. At worst, scientific educational theory may lead to the point where consideration of morality is thought to be either ludicrous or dangerous: Talk about morals is equivalent either to talking about popular astrology--harmless musings, feel-good gibberish--or one's (usually the senior scientists) trying to impose values (read: opinions) on others. Or, talk of morality and moral knowledge mixes religion (non-sense) with science (reason). In an enlightened, secular society such as the United States, religion and science, just as religion and government, do not mix. Indeed,

**A2: Science is true/objective (Space Specific)**

**Claims of scientific objectivity function as a means to avoid criticism. This creates a circular system void of ethics, and flawed knowledge production.**

Whitt 99 (Laurie Anne, prof @ Michigan Technological University)“Value-Bifurcation in Bioscience: The Rhetoric of Research

Justification” Associate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan Technological University.

Perspectives on Science 7.4 (1999) 413-446

The conjunction of value-bifurcation with value-neutrality and the pure/applied science distinction thus sets in play a normative dynamics which offers powerful rhetorical protection, significantly enhancing the force and effectiveness of assertions that the production of scientific knowledge, unlike its use, is value- free. Science is shielded from direct involvement in moral and political debate. 13 Charges that specific initiatives of western science like the HGDP involve material oppression and conceptual domination are muted or dismissed since they embed these initiatives within the political, historical, social, cultural and economic contexts which shape them and which they help shape. 14 No mere "academic" development, this has been of strategic, pragmatic benefit to western science, ensuring that the dynamics of power which mediate scientific practice, and most notably scientific knowledge production, are ignored. Both ethics and politics are moved out of the space of knowledge production, while a de-politicized ethics is reserved for assessing knowledge use. The result, as we will see, is a rhetoric of pursuit or research justification which ensures that favored projects proceed unimpeded by substantive criticism. Normative critiques impact scientific knowledge production only when [End Page 418] favorable; when unfavorable, they are deflected or disengaged, unable to bear upon knowledge production. This serves as a means of managing normative criticism: only so much of a certain kind directed in a particular way to specific areas is allowed.

**Reject their scientific framework. The epistemology of science is void of values and blinds scientists to the consequences of their research and creations- Also a reason that the AFF cannot perm.**

Burkhardt 99 (Jeffery Professor of Ethics and Agricultural Economics in the Institute of Food andAgricultural Sciences of the University of Florida) Scientific Values and Moral Education in theTeaching of Science, Perspectives on Science 7.1 (1999) 87-110

The ways in which the scientific community interacts with the larger society over controversies about scientific discoveries or technological advances are deeply rooted in the epistemological rules of scientific practice. Learning these rules is a fundamental part of the initiation of people into the scientific community. More than simply communicating epistemological standards and practices, however, science education also includes a species of moral education that carries over into scientists' instruction or communication with the public and/or policy makers. Certainly, the teaching of values, and various kinds of moral education occur across the college or university curriculum. Contrary to many scientists' perceptions, however, it is as true of science classes as it is of courses ostensibly devoted to "contemporary moral issues" or "applied ethics." This can be a matter of [End Page 87] some concern, for two reasons: First, the values instruction (or values transmission) which occurs in science classes is usually not acknowledged by the teacher to be values instruction. As a result, students are left with the understanding that the values they are taught are not values. Even if the perceptive student recognizes that he or she is being inculcated with values of some sort (as opposed to "mere" facts or procedures), the fact that they are not acknowledged to be values can lead the student to believe that they are fixed or absolute truths. I am not referring here to instructors' personal biases, but to what I will refer to as "scientific values." The second concern is that the kind of values education that occurs (perhaps subliminally) in science courses often or even usually includes a kind of moral education which does not only the students, but also the scientific community and the larger society a serious disservice. This is because this kind of moral education reinforces in the student the idea that moral considerations are at best extrascientific if not simply irrational. Taken together, the values instruction and morals education that many (dare I say most) scientists unwittingly foist on their students can--and I believe does--lead to the scientific establishment's typical responses to issues surrounding scientific advances such as the cloning of Dolly the sheep (1997). In the face of serious moral questions and challenges from outside the scientific establishment about the morality of cloning, and especially the morality of cloning human beings, the scientific establishment responds with a collective "Huff! What, are you crazy, we would never do that!"

A2: But space is unique/different!

Space exploration is rooted in the same ideology of security as imperialism- it’s not separate from “earthly” politics

MacDonald 2007 (Fraser, prof of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies @ University of Melbourne ) “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography” *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5) (2007) pp. 592–615

My basic claim, then, is that a geographical concern with outer space is an old project, not a new one. A closely related argument is that a geography of outer space is a logical extension of earlier geographies of imperial exploration (for instance, Smith and Godlewska, 1994; Driver, 2001). Space exploration has used exactly the same discourses, the same rationales, and even the same institutional frameworks (such as the International Geophysical Year, 1957–58) as terrestrial exploration. Like its terrestrial counterpart, the move into space has its origins in older imperial enterprises. Marina Benjamin, for instance, argues that for the United States outer space was ‘always a metaphorical extension of the American West’ (Benjamin, 2003: 46). Looking at the imbricated narratives of colonialism and the Arianne space programme in French Guiana, the anthropologist Peter Redfi eld makes the case that ‘outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire’ (Redfi eld, 2002: 795; see also Redfi eld, 2000). The historian of science Richard Sorrenson, writing about the ship as geography’s scientifi c instrument in the age of high empire, draws on the work of David DeVorkin to argue that the V-2 missile was its natural successor (Sorrenson, 1996: 228; see also DeVorkin, 1992). A version of the V-2 – the two-stage ‘Bumper WAC Corporal’ – became the fi rst earthly object to penetrate outer space, reaching an altitude of 244 miles on 24 February 1949 (Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 1961). Moreover, out of this postwar allied V-2 programme came the means by which Britain attempted to reassert its geopolitical might in the context of its own ailing empire. In 1954, when America sold Britain its fi rst nuclear missile – a refi ned version of the WAC Corporal – its possession was seen as a shortcut back to the international stage at a time when Britain’s colonial power was waning fast (Clark, 1994; MacDonald, 2006a). Even if the political geography literature has scarcely engaged with outer space, the advent of rocketry was basically Cold War (imperial) geopolitics under another name. Space exploration then, from its earliest origins to the present day, has been about familiar terrestrial and ideological struggles here on Earth.

A2: Space Weapons inevitable

**The inevitability argument is self-serving and proves our narrative link- the idea that weaponization is inevitable is what makes it so**

Grondin, 6 – Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa (David, The (Power) Politics of Space: The U.S. Astropolitical Discourse of Global Dominance in the War on Terror)

US astropolitical analysts and state agents see space power as the ability to use Outer space as a physical and strategic space analogous to air power and sea power to project military power.15 The militarized securitization of the orbital space by the US comes along a technological matrix that also seeks the territorialization of Space, although this can be (self-)limited. The first point of contention among astropolitical analysts is that of the inevitability of space weaponization. If one reads Steven Lambakis’ *On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power* or Everett Dolman’s *Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*, one will find that there is not a great pool of differences between what these astropolitical thinkers advocate. Both readily accept the presumption of US space power strategy that seeks first and foremost the protection of the freedom of space – for the US enjoys a domination that is unmatched – a principle seated deeply in US state governmentality that remains a critical element of the national security strategy. For Everett Dolman, “the militarization and weaponization of space is not only an historical fact, it is an ongoing process” (Dolman 2002: 5). For Steven Lambakis, “Space may be ‘kept safe’ only if the rest of the world agrees to play by US rules and US concept of strategy. [...] It is [his] contention that the rest of the world will not ‘tow the line’. Neither Washington nor any other government is sufficiently influential to effect the development of foreign strategies and military forces for exploiting space or denying space to the United States” (Lambakis 2001: 263). But for him, “Today the United States is secure in space by default, not because there is a deliberate policy framework and well-resourced, organized, and strategically guided militarily force to guard national space interests. Security cannot be stable when it exists by accident. History supports the belief that hostile foreign governments and nongovernmental entities will endeavor to impair America’s space capabilities or use satellites to their own advantage” (Lambakis 2001). Nevertheless, of the two, Dolman is the most radical, yet perhaps the most influential. Indeed, Dolman seems convinced that the United States must devise an Astropolitik, the grandest strategy of all, which covers the entirety of the Earth. It is not that it will go wrong for sure. As he writes, “the text nowhere concludes that a harsh realist outlook is the only one for the future of space exploration and exploitation. It simply avers that this has been the pattern, and that policymakers should be prepared to deal with a competitive, state-dominated future in space” (Dolman 2002: 2). On the whole issue of space militarization (the use of space for military purposes) and space weaponization (the use of space weapons and of space as a battlefield), RAND’s space power expert Karl Mueller writes that if space militarization is already accepted as reality by most analysts, space weaponization is by no means inevitable nor is it achieved. As he writes, "it is a matter of social construction" and those, like Dolman, who says space is already weaponized used a fallacious argument for "we have not yet crossed the principal space weaponization threshold precisely because almost everyone believes that we have not." For Mueller, "there is good reason for prudent policymakers to assume that the weaponization of space is not in fact predestined, and that US military space policy is one of the factors, though not the only, that will shape the likelihood of space weaponization by other countries."

\*\*AFF Answers\*\*

Perm

AFF and Neg are not ideological opposites- we can question while still taking action

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This article concentrates on Morgenthau’s views on the ethics of scholarship and argues that all his works must be read in the light of his central goal: speaking truth to power. Morgenthau wrote at length, and held very specific views about, the role and function of scholars in society. It is therefore legitimate to claim that, as a scholar himself, Morgenthau attempted to live up to his very demanding definition of scholarly activity, and his assertion that scholars have the moral responsibility to speak truth to power informed all his major works. While Morgenthau’s conception of the ethics of scholarship is generally ignored or neglected, it is, however, indispensable to take it into account when approaching his writings. Indeed, it demonstrates that for Morgenthau, a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions, which are intrinsically linked: it is supposed to explain international relations, but it is also, fundamentally, a normative and critical project which questions the existing status quo. While the explanatory dimension of realism is usually discussed at great length, its critical side is consistently – and conveniently – forgotten or underestimated by the more recent, self-named ‘critical’ approaches. However diverse these recent approaches may be in their arguments, what unites them all is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. The interpretation they provide of realism is well known, and rarely questioned. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to review it at length, it is worth stressing some of the main features which are constantly emphasised. First then, realism is a state-centric approach, by which is meant that it stresses the importance of anarchy and the struggle for power among states. From this, most critical approaches jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore strikingly ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where the state is increasingly regarded as outdated and/or dangerous, because it stands in the path of different, more emancipatory modes of political organisation. Realism, it is also argued, pretends to be objective and to depict ‘things as they are’: but this cannot obscure the fact that theories are never value-neutral and constitute the very ‘reality’ they pretend to ‘describe’. This leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism: it is portrayed as the voice of (great) powers, with the effect of reifying (and therefore legitimising) the existing international order. This explains why Rothstein can confidently argue that realism ‘is . . . implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo’, and that it is a ‘deceptive and dangerous’ theory, not least because it ‘has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to outwit or to dupe domestic dissenters’.2 Such views represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the realist project, but are nonetheless widely accepted as commonsense in the discipline. A typical example of this is the success of Cox’s famous distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory. Unsurprisingly, realism is the archetypal example of a problem-solving theory for Cox. His account of the realist tradition sweepingly equates Morgenthau and Waltz, who are described as ‘American scholars who transformed realism into a form of problem-solving theory’.3 Thereafter in his famous article ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Cox refers to the works of both scholars by using the term ‘neo-realism’. Problem solving theory (and therefore realism) ‘takes the world as it finds it . . . as the given framework for action’, while by contrast, the distinctive trait of ‘critical theory’ is to ‘stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about’.4 Problem-solving theory, says Cox, ‘serves particular national sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order’, which therefore means that its purpose is ‘conservative’.5 Problem-solving theory also pretends to be ‘value free’, while Cox is keen to remind his reader that it contains some ‘latent normative elements’, and that its ‘non normative quality is however, only superficial’.6 By contrast to what Cox presents as a problem-solving theory, being ‘critical’ in IR means being openly normative, challenging the status quo, and seeking to advance human emancipation( s), however this concept is to be defined.7 The picture Cox proposes is therefore simple: critical theory is named as such because of its commitment to ‘bringing about an alternative order’ and because of its openly normative stance, while realism, by contrast, is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and ‘sustain[s] the existing order’.8 To be fair, not all critical theorists promote such a simplistic vision of what realism stands for – Cox himself, in some of his later works, recognised that classical realism possesses an undeniable critical dimension. In 1992, providing a more nuanced analysis of the school, he thus accepted that ‘classical realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power’.9 He did not, however, investigate the critical dimension of realism in much depth, and failed to identify its emancipatory dimension. Other critical theorists demonstrate an awareness of the richness and subtlety of Morgenthau’s ideas. The best example remains Ashley’s famous piece on the poverty of neorealism, where he justly argues that the triumph of the latter has obscured the insights provided by classical realism. Ashley’s analysis remains, however, problematic as his interpretation of Morgenthau does not identify all the critical dimensions of his writings, and ultimately continues to present classical realism as the ‘ideological apparatus’ of one particular ruling group, that of statesmen, which remains essentially incapable of realising its own limitations. As he writes: It is a tradition whose silences and omissions, and failures of self critical nerve join it in secret complicity with an order of domination that reproduces the expectation of inequality as a motivating force, and insecurity as an integrating principle. As the ‘organic intellectuality of the world wide public sphere of bourgeois society, classical realism honors the silences of the tradition it interprets and participates in exempting the ‘private sphere’ from public responsibility.10 (emphasis added) The ‘picture’ of classical realism which is provided by Ashley therefore does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension, as it ultimately presents it as reproducing the existing order and silencing dissent. Cox’s distinction clearly echoes the now classic one between ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ approaches (a label broad enough to include the self-named Critical Theory, Feminism, Normative theory, Constructivism and Post-Structuralism). The diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially, what allows them to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological (usually ‘post-positivist’) or ontological assumptions they may share. It is also, fundamentally, the image they think lies in the mirror when they turn it to realism. In most cases then, it seems to be enough to oppose a simplistic picture of realism like that provided by Cox to deserve the much coveted label ‘critical’. This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a realist scholar and critical, as the two adjectives are implicitly presented as antithetical. This clearly amounts to an insidious high-jacking of the very adjective ‘critical’, which more often than not merely signals that one does not adopt a realist approach. The meaning of the adjective is therefore presented as self-evident, and realism is denied any critical dimension. This is highly problematic as this reinforces a typical ‘self-righteousness’ from these ‘critical’ approaches, which tend to rely on a truncated and misleading picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists’ arguments. The fact that Waltz is always the primary target of these approaches is no coincidence: this article demonstrates that realism as expressed by Morgenthau is at its very core a critical project. In order to challenge the use of the adjective ‘critical’ by some who tend to think of themselves as such simply by virtue of opposing what they mistakenly present as a conservative theoretical project, the article highlights the central normative and critical dimensions underlying Morgenthau’s works. It does so by assessing his views about the ethics of scholarship. The article is divided into two parts. First, it investigates Morgenthau’s ideal of the scholarly activity, which rests upon a specific understanding of the relationship between truth and power. Second, it focuses on some features which, for Morgenthau, constitute a ‘betrayal’ of this ideal (a term he borrowed from Julien Benda). The article demonstrates that contrary to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order, Morgenthau’s formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a subversive force, which should ‘stir up the conscience of society’, and in doing so, challenge the status quo. For Morgenthau, IR scholars have the responsibility to seek truth, against power if needed, and then to speak this truth to power even though power may try to silence or distort the scholar’s voice.11 Giving up this responsibility leads to ideology and blind support for power, which is something that Morgenthau always saw as dangerous, and consistently opposed. His commitment to truth in turn explains why, according to him, political science is always, by definition, a revolutionary force whose main purpose is to bring about ‘change through action’. In complete contrast to what ‘critical approaches’ consistently claim, the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers-that-be.

When it comes to space, we should combine theory and action

Daly and Frodeman, 08.

Erin Moore and Robert, Indiana University. "Separated at Birth, Signs of Rapprochement: Environmental Ethics and Space Exploration." Ethics & the Environment 13.1 (2008): 135-151. Project MUSE. Web. 21 Jan. 2011. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.

Revolutions in philosophic understanding and cultural worldviews inevitably accompany revolutions in science. As we expand our exploration of the heavens, we will also reflect on the broader human implications of advances in space. Moreover, our appreciation of human impact on Earth systems will expand as we come to see the Earth within the context of the solar system. Most fundamentally, we need to anticipate and wrestle with the epistemological**,** metaphysical, and theological dimensions of space exploration, including the possibility of extraterres- trial life and the development of the space environment, as it pertains to our common understanding of the universe and of ourselves. Such reflection should be performed by philosophers, metaphysi- cians, and theologians in regular conversation with the scientists who investigate space and the policy makers that direct the space program**.** The exploration of the universe is no experimental science, contained and controlled in a laboratory, but takes place in a vast and dynamic network of interconnected, interdependent realities. If (environmental) philosophy is to be a significant source of insight, philosophers will need to have a much broader range of effective strategies for interdisciplinary collaborations, framing their reflections with the goal of achieving policy-relevant results. If it is necessary for science and policy-makers to heed the advice of philosophers, it is equally necessary for philosophers to speak in con- crete terms about real-world problems. A philosophic questioning about the relatedness of humans and the universe, in collaboration with a prag- matic, interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems, is the most responsible means of developing both the science and policy for the exploration of the final frontier.

Perm

We must put ethical theory into practice in space- only the perm solves

Reiman 09’[Saara, Department of Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, “Is space an environment?” <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964609000289#sec3>]

Some writers believe that space ethics should arise from practical issues and consist of solutions to these issues. However, such an approach is in danger of becoming casuistic and contradictory - highly impractical once we move beyond covering the most obvious problems. It might be better to try to form some basic ethical principles first and then attempt to apply them to a range of practical issues. This approach would safeguard the integrity of the ethical system and**,** second, it could also be adapted to treat completely new questions. Philosophically it may be beneficial to employ the tools of **e**nvironmental ethics in discussions about space ethics. If we act in space, the ethical questions we encounter often have as much in commonwith environmentalethics as with the philosophy of science or sociology. There already exist ethical questions that have a distinctly environmental ethical undertone (for example: if we discover life, how should we treat it?). This strongly suggests that we should consider space as an environment for practical reasons. Studying space as an environment allows us to have another perspective besides that of human interests. While it is true that studying the ethical questions of space exploration from the perspective of human interests can answer many ethical questions (for instance, cluttering an important orbit with debris is unwise mainly because doing so is against our own best interests in the long term, and this provides a good reason to avoid it[4](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964609000289" \l "fn4)), other questions benefit from combining different perspectives. Questions such as whether or not it is ethically acceptable to mine the rings of Saturn until they are destroyed or to blow the moons of Mars out of existence as part of a nuclear weapons test programme, are questions where applying only a human perspective seems insufficient**.** An account of ethics that does not grant these places some inherent value seems to be lacking something important - the perspective of the object of human actions. If we choose to ignore that perspective, we may fail to realize the full consequences of our actions. When making moral decisions humans have a tendency to count only certain features of the objects of their actions as significant. For example, when discussing the ethics of animal testing, laboratory animals are often portrayed as ‘models’ or biological machines with no subjecthood or interests of their own. In the same way, some space explorers might see the objects of their interest – like the rings of Saturn – only as mineral deposits. Adopting the attitude that the rings of Saturn are an environment in the sense that they can be considered things that have inherent value beyond their value to humans is a way to avoid this kind of blindness. According to Rolston, it is very human but also quite short-sighted to value a system only for its production of life. As he puts it, while life is special in many ways, it is a mistake to believe that this means that lifeless places, ‘mere things’, are beyond appropriate and inappropriate consideration [[8]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964609000289#bib8).

No Link- Space Specific

The K does not disprove the facts- trust science!

Yudkowsky 6 (Eliezer, Research Fellow and Director – Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks”, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, ed. Bostrum, 8-31, http://www.singinst.org/ourresearch/publications/cognitive-biases.pdf)

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise - instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that's a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real-world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer - someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

The K is specific to Bush era space policy- Obama is all about cooperation, not security, Make them prove a specific link

Phillip 11 [Joshua Phillip, The Epoch Times, US Space Strategy Bringing Governance to Outer Space, published February 8th 2011, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/50800/>

Lynn said Obama’s new space strategy brings “a move toward the sustainability and stability of the space domain; a new emphasis on international cooperation; an expansion of how we protect space systems in a contested environment; and, finally, the improvement of our space acquisition process.” According to a DOD summary, the space strategy program, NSSS, “draws on all elements of national power and requires active U.S. leadership in space.” It will include establishing partnerships with “responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms” and will “promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.” It also includes strategy to deter “aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security,” and states the United States will “prepare to defeat attacks and operate in a degraded environment.” The original space policy was set in motion when President Dwight Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. It was at a time, however, when the only competition the United States had in space was the USSR. The United States has been a world leader in space exploration, yet 60 nations now have a presence in space, and “the skies over earth are so cluttered with debris that further collisions could eventually put some usable orbits in jeopardy.”

No Link- Space Specific

Space Policies are different from the security politics the 1NC describes

Reiman 09’[Saara, Department of Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, “Is space an environment?” <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964609000289#sec3>]

One good reason to think that environmental ethics is important and that we ought to regulate our actions towards other beings is that, on Earth, all things are connected and the harm we inflict upon our environment may well become harm done to ourselves. Earth is practically a closed system,1 and we do not yet fully understand its complexity [1]. Even if we agree that there are good reasons to limit the exploitation of Earth and preserve it, do we have to agree that we should adopt similar attitudes regarding outer space? Most people think intuitively that it should make no moral difference whether we travel some thousands of kilometres westwards or upwards. But is this intuition correct? Considering space as something that does not enjoy a moral status equal to that of Earth's environments does not imply that it would be wise for us to exploit it short-sightedly. Certainly, it would still be wise to keep our own long-term interests in mind while planning new projects. However, it is a very different thing to recognize that it is in our own best interest, e.g. to reduce the amount of debris in important orbits (see [2]) or to preserve areas that have important historical or aesthetic value, than it is to say that space, for the most part, has inherent value in the same way that Earth environments are thought to have. On Earth, the term ‘environment’ is loaded in so many ways that ‘space’ is not. Our own well-being is closely connected with the well-being of our planet. If there is excessive pollution we will become ill or may even have to move away from areas that have become unsafe. Space, on the other hand, is extremely hostile to humans to begin with. While it can be argued that some phenomena taking place in space are significant from the perspective of human well-being, our actions in general do not have the power to affect those phenomena in nearly the same way that we can affect the flourishing or extinction of life on Earth. Second, on Earth we have an abundance of life forms. In space we have interesting phenomena but it is lifeless, and in environmental ethics life is of special importance; many central environmental ethical concepts and ideas make sense only when we are talking about places where there is life. It is still under dispute how far we should go to protect and cherish life here on Earth. Another complication is that the theory of environmental ethics is often quite different from the practices in place in various levels of society: even when we know that polluting our environment is harmful, we often choose to do it anyway for one reason or another. Keeping this in mind, it may be difficult to argue that we should prohibit all exploitation of space on the grounds that pollution in the process is inevitable. For instance, if we think about the idea of terraforming Mars, the ‘ethics of life’ makes a great deal of sense. If there is indigenous life on Mars, the question is: would it thrive more if the atmosphere were denser, if there were steady supplies of water on the surface, etc. Or would such life suffer and perhaps even become extinct? In the latter case, terraforming would not be ethically acceptable because doing so would diminish the diversity of life in the universe, even if we could later bring Earth life to Mars. Spreading life from Earth to other planets would just increase its quantity (and consequently the chances of survival were a disaster to make Earth hostile to such life). But Martian life would be qualitatively different and, therefore, losing it would be a loss that could not be compensated by introducing Terran life to a terraformed Mars, even if it were possible to introduce more species than originally existed on that planet. The danger, as pointed out by Williamson, is that an attempt to terraform Mars - the most likely candidate - could destroy existing but undiscovered life forms, as well as changing existing landforms and other physical features [1]. Strictly speaking, it is unlikely that, at the time when a decision to terraform another planet was made, we could completely exclude from consideration the possibility of the existence of life not yet discovered. A good question is thus when is the likelihood of discovering hidden life low enough to justify terraforming? On the other hand, if we can assert with great certainty that Mars is a dead planet, then terraforming it would be a good deed**,** as it would make Mars more diverse, a more special place than it is as a lifeless place, as well as increasing the chances of long-term survival for species that could be introduced to a new planet. Interesting geological features of Mars would still probably exist and possibly even provide a base for forming new kinds of ecosystems capable of supporting the evolution of species that could not evolve on Earth. Our connection with minor planets, comets and stars is very thin, however. How could building polluting mines on Ceres affect human welfare at all (except that it might reduce pollution on Earth)? And since Ceres is – as far as we know - a lifeless place, what good would be gained by investing in expensive systems that reduce pollution? The concept of pollution is a negative one, something that is undesirable and produces adverse effects. It may, however, be misleading to talk about pollution in places where there is nothing that could be affected adversely**.** Not every effect that is caused by human action, nor every alteration to a natural state, may be adverse. Not every piece of discarded material may be pollution - the presence of that material has to produce bad consequences in some way. In many cases, humans will be the ones to suffer from a build-up of debris. In the case of congested major orbits this is already true [1]. This fact can be acknowledged without talking about ‘harm to the environment’ in cases where the existence of an ‘environment’ is questionable. Besides, most of what we can perceive in outer space is not nearly as complex as any one square metre of Earth, a planet soaked in life.2 Rocks and snowballs, clouds of dust and stars are fascinating, but often lack complexity compared to the smallest eucaryotes found on Earth. While some space environments display phenomena that are not known on Earth, others do not. It is perfectly coherent to think that we ought to protect life on Earth and at the same time believe that, apart from a few special places – such as the Apollo landing site and the geostationary orbit - exploitation of space has few ethical issues unrelated to the protection of mankind's long-term interests. Therefore, we might as well talk about protection of humanity's long-term interests when appropriate, without assigning any special moral status to space.

Security Reps Turn

Claiming a link to security rhetoric or reps means that anything can be critiqued as “securitization.” This makes the K politically void and meaningless

Williams 03(Michael C., university of Whales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, JSTOR)

This stance allows the Copenhagen School to argue simultaneously for both an expansion and a limitation of the security agenda and its analysis. On the one hand, treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the "referent objects" of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School has argued that security can usefully be viewed as comprising five "sectors," each with their particular referent object and threat agenda (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998).6 In the "military" sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the "political" sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements. Conversely, while treating security as a speech-act allows a remarkable broadening of analysis, securitization theory seeks also to limit the security agenda. Security, the Copenhagen School argues, is not synonymous with "harm" or with the avoidance of whatever else might be deemed malign or damaging (Buzan et al., 1998:2-5, 203-12). As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of "security." These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any "securitizing actor" can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference. Not all claims are socially effective, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. This means, as Buzan and Waever put it, that the "Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made ('The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked')" (Buzan et al., 1998:32). The claims that are likely to be effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can effectively be spoken are usually deeply "sedimented" (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis (Waever, 2000)-and not wholly open and expandable. Finally, while empirical contexts and claims cannot in this view ultimately determine what are taken as security issues or threats, they provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue.

**Focusing on security as a speech act ignores real violence making it morally irresponsible**

Williams 03(Michael C., university of Whales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, JSTOR)

A second major criticism of the Copenhagen School concerns the ethics of securitization. Simply put, if security is nothing more than a specific form of social practice-a speech-act tied to existential threat and a politics of emergency-then does this mean that anything can be treated as a "security" issue and that, as a consequence, any form of violent, exclusionary, or irrationalist politics must be viewed simply as another form of "speech-act" and treated "objectively"? Questions such as these have led many to ask whether despite its avowedly "constructivist" view of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency.29 A first response to this issue is to note that the Copenhagen School has not shied away from confronting it. In numerous places the question of the ethics of securitization are discussed as raising difficult issues.

Alt Turns

Rejecting Security discourse will only lead to more violent politics

Williams 03 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4)

It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend–enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equally clearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization, even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes and constructions emerge and become viable is important but incomplete, for without some basis for avoiding this process and transforming it the Copenhagen School appears to risk replicating some of the worst excesses made possibleby a Schmittian understanding of politics.

Rejecting a speech act because it links to security is securitizing, replicating the harms the K claims to solve.

Williams 03 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 7-10-9)

I would like to suggest that it is in response to these issues, and in regard to the realm of ethical practice, that the idea of security as a speech-act takes on an importance well beyond its role as a tool of social explanation. Casting securitization as a speechact places that act within a framework of communicative action and legitimation that links it to a discursive ethics that seeks to avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization**.** While the Copenhagen School has been insufficiently clear in developing these aspects of securitization theory, they link clearly to some of the most interesting current analyses of the practical ethics of social-constructivism. As Thomas Risse (2000) has recently argued, communicative action is not simply a realm of instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation. Communicative action involves a process of argument, the provision of reasons, presentation of evidence, and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one’s position. Communicative action (speech-acts) are thus not just given social practices, they are implicated in a process of justification. Moreover, as processes of dialogue, communicative action has a potentially transformative capacity. As Risse puts it: Argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. When actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities. (2000: 2)31 As speech-acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Speech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security perceptions both within and between states. The securitizing speech-act must be accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that ‘‘[a]ccept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent,’’ it is nonetheless the case that ‘‘[s]ince securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case’**’**(Buzan et al., 1998: 23), and that ‘‘[s]uccessful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects’’(1998:31**).** It is via this commitment to communicative action and discursive ethics, I would like to suggest, that the Copenhagen School seeks to avoid **the** radical realpolitik that might otherwise seem necessarily to follow from the Schmittian elements of the theory of securitization. Schmitt appeals to the necessity and inescapability of decision, enmity, and ‘‘the political.’’ He appeals to the mobilizing power of myth in the production of friends and enemies, and asserts the need for a single point of decision to the point of justifying dictatorship. He mythologizes war and enmity as the paramount moments of political life.32

No Alt Solvency

While the neg may reject security, real world violence and wars will continue without pragmatic realism

O'Callaghan, 02 (Terry , lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 79-80)

In fact, if we explore the depths of George's writings further, we find remarkable brevity in their scope, failing to engage with practical issues beyond platitudes and homilies. George, for example, is concerned about the violent, dangerous and war-prone character of the present international system. And rightly so. The world is a cruel and unforgiving place, especially for those who suffer the indignity of human suffering beneath tyrannous leaders, warrior states, and greedy self-serving elites. But surely the problem of violence is not banished from the international arena once the global stranglehold of realist thinking is finally broken? It is important to try to determine the levels of violence that might be expected in a nonrealist world. How will internecine conflict be managed? How do postmodernists like George go about managing conflict between marginalized groups whose "voices" collide? It is one thing to talk about the failure of current realist thinking, but there is absolutely nothing in George's statements to suggest that he has discovered solutions to handle events in Bosnia, the Middle East, or East Timor. Postmodern approaches look as impoverished in this regard as do realist perspectives. Indeed, it is interesting to note that George gives conditional support for the actions of the United States in Haiti and Somalia "because on balance they gave people some hope where there was none" (George, 1994:231). Brute force, power politics, and interventionism do apparently have a place in George's postmodem world. But even so, the Haitian and Somalian cases are hardly in the same intransigent category as those of Bosnia or the Middle East. Indeed, the Americans pulled out of Somalia as soon as events took a turn for the worse and, in the process, received a great deal of criticism from the international community. Would George have done the same thing? Would he have left the Taliban to their devices in light of their complicity in the events of September 11? Would he have left the Somalians to wallow in poverty and misery? Would he have been willing to sacrifice the lives of a number of young men and women (American, Australian, French, or whatever) to subdue Aidid and his minions in order to restore social and political stability to Somalia? To be blunt, I wonder how much better off the international community would be if Jim George were put in charge of foreign affairs. This is not a fatuous point. After all, George wants to suggest that students of international politics are implicated in the trials and tribulations of international politics. All of us should be willing, therefore, to accept such a role, even hypothetically. I suspect, however, that were George actually to confront some of the dilemmas that policymakers do on a daily basis, he would find that teaching the Bosnian Serbs about the dangers of modernism, universalism and positivism, and asking them to be more tolerant and sensitive would not meet with much success. True, it may not be a whole lot worse than current realist approaches, but the point is that George has not demonstrated how his views might make a meaningful difference. Saying that they will is not enough, especially given that the outcomes of such strategies might cost people their lives. Nor, indeed, am I asking George to develop a "research project" along positivist lines. On the contrary, I am merely asking him to show how his position can make a difference to the "hard cases" in international politics. My point is thus a simple one. Despite George's pronouncements, there is little in his work to show that he has much appreciation for the kind of moral dilemmas that Augustine wrestled with in his early writings and that confront human beings every day. Were this the case, George would not have painted such a black-and- white picture of the study of international politics.

No Alt Solvency

**Security theory isolates itself from politics- unless it can offer a policy solution, the alternative has no hope of solving**

Walt 99 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security, 23(4),)

Taken together, these characteristics help explain why recent formal work has had relatively little to say about important real-world security issues. Although formal techniques produce precise, logically consistent arguments, they often rest on unrealistic assumptions and the results are rarely translated into clear and accessible conclusions. And because many formal conjectures are often untested, policymakers and concerned citizens have no way of knowing if the arguments are valid. In this sense, much of the recent formal work in security studies reflects the "cult of irrelevance" that pervades much of contemporary social science. Instead of using their expertise to address important real-world problems, academics often focus on narrow and trivial problems that may impress their colleagues but are of little practical value. If formal theory were to dominate security studies as it has other areas of political science, much of the scholarship in the field would likely be produced by people with impressive technical skills but little or no substantive knowledge of history, politics, or strategy.[111] Such fields are prone to become "method-driven" rather than "problem-driven," as research topics are chosen not because they are important but because they are amenable to analysis by the reigning methode du jour.[112] Instead of being a source of independent criticism and creative, socially useful ideas, the academic world becomes an isolated community engaged solely in dialogue with itself.[113] Throughout most of the postwar period, the field of security studies managed to avoid this danger. It has been theoretically and methodologically diverse, but its agenda has been shaped more by real-world problems than by methodological fads. New theoretical or methodological innovations have been brought to bear on particular research puzzles, but the field as a whole has retained considerable real-world relevance. By contrast, recent formal work in security studies has little to say about contemporary security issues. Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the post-Cold War world; the character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribution of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conflict; the future role of nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods, and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others.[114] Thus one of the main strengths of the subfield of security studies--namely, its close connection to real-world issues--could be lost if the narrow tendencies of the modeling community took control of its research agenda.

No Alt Solvency

By trying to escape security the neg links to itself

Huysmans 02, MA (University of Hull), Jef, Ph.D. (University of Leuven)) Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, Director of the Center for Citizenship, Identities, Governance, " Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security", Alternatives January 02

It has been suggested above that this sociological approach brackets an interpretation of the symbolic logic--what some would call the grammar--of the security formation. That is what Waever briefly touches on when he discusses the logic of security by means of the logic of war read through the lens of national security. (39) Both Waever's work and Bigo's seem to presuppose that securitization implies that a particular logic (the security formation) is invested in issue areas when they are successfully securitized. They have to assume something like Waever's "logic of war read through the national security lens" because that logic explains the specific effects that securitization has on social relations. Once some key elements of the formation are sketched, they bracket it to concentrate on the institutional rarefaction of security utterances and the institutional basis of the mobilization of security dispositions. Consequently, the sociological research project does not raise the question of how the securit y formation is entrenched in a symbolic, cultural order or how this formation can change by securitizing sectors other than the military and that of internal public order in which its modern form was constructed. They thus focus on a particular aspect of the discursive formation, leaving another dimension underexplored. This is not without consequences. For example, it makes the research relatively insensitive to changes in the security formation itself resulting from security utterances being employed in nontraditional security contexts (e.g., the environment or migration) or other cultural contexts. The view of the logic is a rather static one: the formation is a particular organization of social relations that is reproduced in the areas that are securitized. Securitization thus consists of successfully transferring the specific security formation to other sectors. Change of the formation itself drops out of the picture. This research project focusing on the institutionalization of threat environments does not escape the normative dilemma of social-constructivist security studies. As with any security analysis, by uttering security language it risks confirming the securitization of an area that it would prefer not to be securitized. But because it cuts into the dilemma from the question of the rarefaction of security utterances, it differentiates the normative dilemma somewhat. As stated up to now, the dilemma rests on the general assumption that utterances have a performative force and that agents uttering security do not fully control the way they utter and the effects of the utterance. Sociological inquiries into the conditions of the mobilization of security dispositions can show that not all utterances have an equal capacity to "securitize." It depends on the position from which the utterance is spoken and on how it is constructed. In other words, some security utterances have a higher capacity to mobilize security disp ositions than others. This also counts for the way security studies reproduces security language. For example, Bigo's research implies that his own statements have not the same capacity to securitize internal affairs as a more technical research that tries to correctly define threats and so forth. Why? In his interpretation of the process, to increase its capacity for securitization the professional knowledge produced by security Professionals--which can include academics--should be formulated in a technical, rational language.

Security Good

Security can be good, the neg must prove that security in the particular instance of the 1AC is bad

Huysmans 02, MA (University of Hull),jef Ph.D. (University of Leuven)) Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, Director of the Center for Citizenship, Identities, Governance, " Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security", Alternatives January 02 (questia)

There is no solution for the normative dilemma in the social-constructivist security analyses defined above. The particular understanding of language makes any security utterance potentially securitizing. Consequently, enunciating security is never innocent or neutral. Of course, this does not have to result in a normative dilemma; it does so only if one wants to or has to utter security in a political context while wanting to avoid a securitization of a particular area. Someone may also employ security language with the intention of securitizing an area. This does not necessarily require a conservative interest in keeping the status quo or in establishing law and order. Securitization can also be performed with an emancipatory interest. Given the capacity of security language to prioritize questions and to mobilize people, one may employ it as a tactical device to give human-rights questions a higher visibility, for example. It is also possible to mobilize security questions in nonsecurity areas with the intention to change the conservative bias of the security language. This would require a positive concept of security that defines liberation from oppression as a good that should be secured. (40)

**If we prove that our threats are real, it justifies security, turning the K**

Liotta 05 (PH, Professor of Humanities and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University, security dialogue 36:1 "through the looking glass: creeping vulnerabilities and the reordering of security")

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment.

Security Good- Space Specific

Security is the best approach to space

Sheehan 2007 [Michael The International Politics of Space Series: Space Power and Politics Series editors: Everett C. Dolman and John Sheldon Both School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Air, Maxwell, USA http://bib.tiera.ru/dvd64/Sheehan%20M.%20-%20The%20International%20Politics%20of%20Space%282007%29%28248%29.pdf

As with the skies in the early twentieth century, space evolved from being seen simply as an environment in which the use of force on the ground might be aided, to a dimension in which combat would take place, as each side sought to exploit the military use of space, and deny its use to the enemy. The logic of the inevitabilityof such developments is in line with the realist approach to international relations, and it is similarly a self-fulfi lling prophecy to the extent that states act as if it was true. Neorealism can also be felt to be validated by the convergence in goals that has occurred over the same period. By the mid-1980s the various space programmes had obvious similarities, but also important differences. A key feature of the neorealist explanation of international relations is the argument that the security dilemma compels states to behave in essentially similar ways if they are to survive and prosper. The constraints of the system drive states to become functionally alike in the security realm. There is evidence to support this claim in the evolution of several space programmes in the past three decades. The programmes of Japan and the European Space Agency, for example, originally had no military dimension, while those of China and India lacked a manned presence in space, nor did any of these national and international programmes seem to feel that these absences constituted a signifi cant weakness. In the past two decades, however, the various programmes have become increasingly similar in terms of their content and objectives. Europe and Japan have now added a military dimension, while China has acquired a manned programme and India has announced its intention to do so. These developments appear to validate the neorealist argument that states in the international system differ in capability, but exhibit a similarity in objectives and process, and indeed are obliged to do so by the nature of the system.25 Neorealists like Waltz argue that states are obliged to be functionally alike, that they tend to operate with a similar range of instruments and to use them in remarkably similar ways, constrained only by the comparative resources available to them. Against this, realist assumptions about the likelihood of competition in the international anarchy are not necessarily borne out by the history of space policy. For realists, states are not inclined to cooperate unless there are compelling reasons to do so, because of the mutual insecurity they experience under the security dilemma. Weber, for example, argues that international cooperation is likely to be limited, and where it does occur, will be ‘tenuous, unstable and limited to issues of peripheral importance’.26 In space policy, however, states have frequently sought out opportunities to cooperate and have often self-consciously seen this as a possible way to mitigate the dangers inherent in an adversarial relationship such as that between the superpowers during the Cold War,27 or between China and Russia. Some realist proponents allow for such cooperation. Glaser, for example ,argues that there will be circumstances where a state’s best security strategy will be cooperation rather than competition.28 For realists, statesmanship is about ‘mitigating and managing, not eliminating confl ict; seeking a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one’.29 There is clearly an appropriate place for international cooperation in such a world view, though it is not seen as overcoming the essentially confl ictual nature of international relations. Thus, space activity brought an alteration in the visible measurement of power, in its image, but not in the underlying fundamentals. Given the dominance of realist thinking in the early years of the space age therefore, it was always likely that competition, rather than cooperation, would be the dominant political theme.30

Threats are real

Neg claims are wrong- States usually underestimated threats, but we still have to plan

Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.